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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2(a)-
3(j), as this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2(a)-3(j). 
Issues Presented For Review 
1. Did the district court correctly interpret and apply the parties' prenuptial 
agreement? Prenuptial agreements are "construed and treated as ... contracts in general." 
Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The lower court's 
"interpretation of a contract presents a question of law, which we review for correctness." 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, f 16, 84 P.3d 1134. 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Appellant's motion to compel 
discovery? "Generally, the trial court is granted broad latitude in handling discovery 
matters." R&REnergies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068,1079 (Utah 1997) 
(citation omitted). This Court will "not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous 
conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's rulings." Askew 
v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996). 
3 • Did the district court err when it determined the amount of the alimony award? 
District courts have "'considerable discretion in determining alimony... and [determinations 
of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is 
demonstrated.'" Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, If 15, 138 P.3d 84 (quoting Davis v. 
4 
Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ^  7, 76 P.3d 716 (alterations in original)). 
4. Did the district court err in regard to its attorney fee determinations? "'The 
decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion 
of the trial court.'" Riley, 2006 UT App 214, *h 15 (quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 
947 (Utah Ct.App.1998). This determination is reviewed for abuse of that discretion. See 
Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (overruled on other grounds by 
Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 2 P.3d 442). 
Statement of the Case 
Appellant's "Statement of the Facts" is incorrect and ignores the actual findings made 
by the district court, which findings have not been properly attacked by Appellant. To 
successfully challenge these findings, Appellant "must marshal the evidence in support of 
the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly 
erroneous." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429,431 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quotations and 
citations omitted). "If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes 
that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the 
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." 
Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 
Because Appellant has made no effort to marshal the evidence or attack the district 
court's factual findings, the facts of this case are as set forth in the district court's Findings 
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 2347-2396, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum Ex. 1 and incorporated herein by this reference.1 
Summary of Arguments 
Appellant cannot show any error committed by the district court when it 
interpreted and applied the prenuptial agreement. The terms of that agreement are clear and 
consistent with the district court's interpretation and application thereof. 
Appellant is unable to show any abuse of discretion relating to the district court's 
discovery ruling; to the contrary, because the information sought by Appellant was irrelevant, 
the district court's denial of such discovery was correct. 
Last, Appellant fails to show any abuse of discretion relating to the district court's 
alimony award or its determinations relating to attorney fees. Appellant's argument that her 
version of the facts should have been accepted by the district court is insufficient on appeal, 
and Appellant offers no legal basis for her argument that the attorney fee awards were 
improper. 
Accordingly, the district court's ruling should be affirmed. In addition, Appellee 
should be awarded his attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
Argument 
L Appellant Fails to Show Any Error Committed by the District 
Court in its Construction and Application of the Prenuptial 
Agreement. 
lrThe district court clarified and modified certain factual findings in a Ruling dated 
October 12, 2007, which Ruling is attached hereto as Addendum Ex. 2. 
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Appellant alleges that the district court erred as a matter of law in its construction of 
the prenuptial agreement (a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum Ex. 4). 
Specifically, Appellant argues that the court erred when it failed to construe this agreement 
in her favor. This argument is without merit. 
Utah courts have "explicitly acknowledged the general authority of spouses or 
prospective spouses to arrange property rights by a contract that is recognized and enforced 
by a court in the event of a divorce." Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, \ 24,984 P.2d 987. "Such 
agreements are 'construed and treated as...contracts in general.'" Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431 
(quotingBerman v. Berman, 749P.2d 1271,1273 (Utah App. 1988). "Therefore, the first step 
in interpreting a prenuptial agreement is to look 'to the four corners of the agreement to 
determine the intention of the parties.'" Id. (quoting Neilson v. Neilson,! 80 ?.2d 1264,1267 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
Prenuptial agreements "'are valid so long as there is no fraud, coercion, or material 
nondisclosure.'" Shepherd, 876P.2d at 431 (quoting Buck v. Huck, 734P.2d417,419 (Utah 
1986); see also Matter of Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1994) ("premarital 
agreements are valid provided there is no material nondisclosure in connection with their 
negotiation and execution."). As described by the Utah Supreme Court: 
[T]he general principle derived from our case law is that 
spouses or prospective spouses may make binding contracts with 
each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the 
negotiations are conducted in good faith...and do not 
unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory duties. 
7 
Reese, 1999 UT 75, f 25 (citations omitted). 
The district court followed these guidelines and determined that the prenuptial 
agreement was valid, enforceable and binding on the parties. See Ruling on Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment (R. 1029-34); see also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
p.3, Tf 8 (R. 2349) ("the evidence presented at trial reinforces the Court's determination that 
the Agreement is valid and enforceable"). The court specifically held that, at the time of the 
execution of this aigreement, both parties "were represented by capable counsel in negotiating 
the prenuptial agreement and there were negotiations back and forth that resulted in a final 
agreement that reflected input from both [parties]." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, p.3, *H 9. 
Appellant does not challenge the district court's findings, nor its conclusion that the 
prenuptial agreement was "valid and enforceable." Instead, Appellant argues 
In this case, the trial court made no findings, and 
apparently gave no consideration whatsoever, to whether the 
ultimate outcome it imposed was just, fair and equitable to both 
panies. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 31. This assertion is without any legal basis; a district court's failure 
to interpret a prenuptial agreement in Appellant's favor is not a ground for reversal. 
As set forth above, the general rule is that prenuptial agreements are valid as long as 
"there is no fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.'" Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431; see also 
Reese, 1999 UT 75, f 25. There is no argument by Appellant that any of these exceptions 
apply. Instead, Appellant offers the unique argument that, because a district court may have 
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some discretion to modify prenuptial agreements, a district court's decision not to exercise 
that discretion creates a ground for reversal as a matter of law; in other words, the argument 
seems to be that the failure to exercise discretion constitutes an abuse of that discretion. This 
argument is unsupported, defies common sense, would eviscerate the general rule set forth 
in Reese, 1999 UT 75, f 25, and would nullify the right of parties to arrange their property 
division through contract. See id., \ 24. There is simply no requirement that a district court, 
after determining the validity of a prenuptial agreement, conduct an additional and 
independent factual inquiry as to the fairness of that document. Indeed, it is presumably the 
analysis set forth in Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431, that answers this question. In any event, even 
if one gives this unsupported argument the benefit of the doubt, Appellant fails to set forth 
any facts of record that could show that such an inquiry would produce a different result. See 
Mule-Hide Products Co., Inc. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, f 12, 40 P.3d 1155 ("Even where 
error is found, reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of all the 
evidence presented at trial, it appears that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that a different result would have been reached." (quotations and citation omitted)). 
Accordingly, Appellant has failed to provide a ground for reversal. 
II. Appellant Fails to Establish Error by the District Court When 
it Interpreted "Earnings" Under the Prenuptial Agreement. 
Appellant argues that the district court erred when it determined there were no 
"earnings" to divide between the parties under the prenuptial agreement. Appellant 
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does not attack the district court's findings on this matter, but merely reargues its 
unsuccessful position that "earnings" should be interpreted extremely broadly. This 
argument is insufficient to substantiate district court error. 
The district court's determinations regarding "earnings" under the prenuptial 
agreement were predicated on numerous findings, including the following: 
36. The Agreement, paragraphs D and F. 1 
reverses the presumption under California law that any income 
resulting from the efforts of a husband or wife during marriage, 
and any property acquired with that income, is community 
property. Instead, all income, and all property acquired with that 
income, is separate property unless the Agreement provides 
otherwise. 
3 7. Subparagraph D. 1 of the Agreement provides 
that earnings are governed by paragraph F. Subparagraph F.l of 
the Agreement provides that earnings from personal services, 
skills, efforts, talents, or work are separate property, except as 
the Agreement specifically provides. Subparagraph F.2 of the 
Agreement creates a community property right in the "earnings" 
or "base salary" derived from actual effort or employment of 
Robert. Earnings or base salary are defined as compensation for 
labor or services performed by Robert, but do not include any 
benefits associated with such earnings or base salary. 
38. The only earnings or base salary derived from 
actual efforts of Robert were paid to him during the first four 
months following the marriage and were promptly consumed on 
community expenses, thus leaving no community property. 
39. Subparagraph F.3 of the Agreement provides 
that: In the event [Robert] enters into any type of business 
venture or ventures from and after the date of marriage from 
which [Robert] will receive earnings or salary therefrom 
(regardless of whether such earnings or salary have been derived 
from actual effort or services performed by [Robert] for or on 
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behalf of the business venture), such earnings or salary, derived 
from such business venture or ventures, shall be community 
property. For purposes of this paragraph f.3, the term 
"earnings" or "salary" derived from said business venture or 
ventures excludes pension and deferred income contributions, 
stock, stock options, bonuses, benefits and rights and 
perquisites, which items shall remain | Robert's] separate 
property subject to Paragraphs F.5, F.6, and b .7. It is the parties 
intention that all property acquired with such "earnings" or 
"salary" (defined under this Paragraph F.3) shall be community 
property unless the parties agree otherwise in writing 
40. The parties dispute the meaning of the term 
"earnings" as used in h i Robert maintains that the inclusion 
of the phrase "whether such earnings or salary ha\e been 
derived from actual effort or services performed by Robert for 
or on behalf of the business venture" simply loosens the 
requirement that Robert actually perform services for his 
business venture to make his earnings or salary community 
property and the term "earnings" still lias the customary 
meaning under California law. California law defines earnings 
as salary or wages of a person received because of services 
provided. Hope maintains that the term "earnings" as used in 
F.3 includes any and all profits allocated to Robert from [Flat 
Iron Mesa and the Resort] 
4 1 This Court is required to read the Agreement as 
w hole in order to determine the meaning and intent of the parties 
and In harmonize its various provisions. Therefore, 
Subparagraph F.3 must be interpreted in light of the It J lowing 
precisions of the Agreement: 
a. Subparagraph F .4 which defines Kellwood 
payments, except salar), as ,i'porate 
property. 
b. Sul | in i mi 11 ill I i* III In creates a 
mffffiiiinih pmperts iM'hl in bonuses 
K . . i 1 1 ) Robert as a11 1111 loyee under 
limited circumstances, t he Court finds 
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that none of these limited circumstances 
apply. 
Subparagraph F.6 which provides an 
additional community property right in 
bonuses based on the duration of the 
marriage. The Court finds that there were 
no bonuses paid to Robert that would 
invoke this subparagraph. 
Subparagraph F.7 which provides a 
community property right in pension 
payments based on longevity of the 
marriage. The Court finds that Robert has 
not received any pension payments. 
Subparagraph F. 8 excludes any community 
property participation in stock options or 
dividends. 
Subparagraph F.9 which provides that 
earnings or salary from joint business 
ventures are community property, but joint 
business ventures must be established by 
written agreement. The Court finds that 
there were no joint business ventures. 
Paragraph I of the Agreement provides 
that all profits, rents, increase, appreciation 
and income from Robert's separate 
property are also his property. A change in 
the form of Robert's separate property 
does not change the characterization of 
that property. If Robert sells separate 
property and purchases other property, that 
new property is also Robert's separate 
property. 
Paragraph J of the Agreement provides 
that devoting time, skill or effort to 
12 
separate property does not ehanne it to 
community property. 
42. The Cowl finds that Hope's .inserted meaning 
ol tin term "earnings" as used in subparagraph h i to mean any 
kind of profit from any business venture lo be untenable. The 
Court accepts Robert's interpretation as valid under California 
law and finds that the terms "earnings" means payments based 
at least in theory on services, such as actual salary, guaranteed 
payments to a member in a limited liability company, or draws 
to a partner in an operating business partnership. Any other 
interpretation would be in conflict with the remainder of the 
Agreement and render it superfluous. The Court finds it hard to 
believe that Robert went to the trouble of obtaining such a 
comprehensive and detailed prenuptial agreement so that he 
could ensure that Hope could claim one-half of the profits from 
any business venture in which he would become involved. 
43. Hope also attempted to persuade the Court that 
Robert was actively engaged in the management of Flat Iron 
Mesa. The Court rejects this argument and finds that Robert had 
virtually no active involvement in Flat Iron \h was a passive 
investor. Even if the Court were to adopl I Inpe's argument 
however, there would still not be any earnings as contemplated 
by the Agreement because it was Robert's capital investment, 
not his business efforts, that resulted in profits from Flat Iron. 
44. The Court finds that Robert did not receive an) 
earnings or salary from the Resort oi I I at Iron Mesa as 
contemplated by the Agreement and there is no community 
property. 
45. Although the Court finds that the Agreement in 
unambiguous and can be interpreted as a matter of law, even if 
the Court were to consider parol evidence, its interpretation of 
the term "earnings" would be the same. Robert testified that he 
always intended that Hope would only participate in his base 
salary and then in bonuses and pension payments in the limited 
circumstances set forth above. Robert specifically remembers 
discussing the contents of F.3 and understanding it to mean that 
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Hope would only participate in his wages, salary, or other 
similar payments resulting from any new active business he may 
start. Robert's interpretation of the term "earnings" is consistent 
with the overall expressed purpose of the Agreement. Hope had 
virtually no recollection of the specific provisions of the 
Agreement even though her attorney discussed the terms of the 
Agreement with her on numerous occasions. Hope's description 
of what she understood the Agreement to mean was general and 
did not appear to be based on any actual memory of the 
language of the Agreement or advice of her counsel. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, fflf 36-45, pp. 11-17 (R.2358-2363). The district 
court also gave a detailed explanation for its ruling in its September 14,2007 Memorandum 
Decision, pp. 11 -19 (R.2239-47) (attached hereto as Addendum Ex. 3). Appellant makes no 
effort to challenge the district court's findings, and this Court may therefore assume that the 
record supports such findings. See Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431; Saunders v. 
Sharp, 806 P.2d at 199; Matter of Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d at 1349. 
Instead, Appellant re-argues that the term "earnings" should be read extremely 
broadly, so that it encompasses any increase in Appellee's separate property. This argument 
is once again without basis. The prenuptial agreement defines earnings as "compensation 
for labor or services performed by Petitioner." Prenuptial agreement, p. 9. Similarly, the 
California Supreme Court recently held that the common definition of earnings is "the salary 
or wages of a person." Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc., 165 P.3d 133, 138 
(Cal. 2007) (citing American Heritage Diet., 2d college ed. 1985). Appellant has not taken 
a salary or wages in relation to the developments at issue; therefore there are no earnings 
under the prenuptial agreement. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Yfl 38-42;. 
14 
September 14, 2007 Memorandum Decision, p i " . 
Appellant gives no explanation as to why the term earnings should In cvpandui 
humid iK planum jiiiiii' lln lin in l rihloiMM ri» 111 Ml,ih i> (li.il premaiital agreements 
I 
are interpreted according to the ordinary rules of contract construction. See In re Bonds, 5 
I 
P.3d 815, 24 Cal.4th 1,11 (Cal. 2000); Shepherd, 876 P2d at 4 \\ 1 hesc rules lequire that 
a contract be read as a whole in order In dilcriiiinr lln* niramim urinl mluit w\ lln p irfir iml 
lo tnniioni/e it1 * .inoti^ piovisions.*See General Precision, Inc. v. hit lAss'n of Machinists, 
241 Cal.App.2d 744, 747 (Cal App 1966); Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 431. The intent of the 
parties is set forth extensively and repeatedly throughout Hie piumplial ayieeim mil 1 ml 
to kfVfi tin p.itliVs" st'parnlr pioptTh separate, including all rents, issues, profits, increase, 
appieciation, and income from that separate property. See prenuptial agreement, pg. 19. 
To adopt Appellant's interpretation of the prenuptial agreement would m >L on!) k in 
duetl iiiilicitlli linn ilh lli ihumi inr.uiiiuj JIIIMI ml nl I lln purlin1» it would render 
I 
virtually the entire prenuptial agreement superfluous. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, f^ 42 ("The Court finds that Hope's asserted meaning of the term "earnings .. lo be 
untenable. !!:-. '" :"' ! ! l!:a« ' " " - s •*' ' ; " ( " • ' l,J ' l 
theor\ on services, such as actual salary.... Any other interpretation would be in conflict with 
the remainder of the Agreement and render it superfluous."). The prenuptial agreement is 
not ambiguous and Appellant sattenipl In lind aiiihiruilu s U\ discussing i .nlali d word Mind 
phhisrs frnni f Ihcai'/eniinif f \> imeotn mvmgrin re Miller,2004 WL 1966062 * 3 (Cal. App. 
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2nd. Dist, 2004). The only tenable reading of this section is to interpret it to mean that all 
earnings or salary taken by Appellee are to be treated as earnings even if his labor and efforts 
did not directly result in the earnings that were taken. Because the district court found that 
Appellant has never taken salary or earnings as contemplated by the prenuptial agreement, 
there are no "earnings." 
Moreover, Appellant's focus on the definition of "earnings" as set forth in the 
prenuptial agreement is performed in a vacuum; she supplies this Court with no facts that 
could support a different ruling, even if the Court were to accept her definition of "earnings." 
Thus, much like in the preceding section, Appellant fails to set forth any facts of record that 
could show that a different definition of "earnings" would produce a different result. See 
Mule-Hide Products Co., Inc. v. White, 2002 UT App 1, \ 12 40 P.3d 1155 (holding that 
"reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of all the evidence presented 
at trial, it appears that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result 
would have been reached."). 
Accordingly, Appellant fails to set forth a reason to reverse the district court's 
determinations relating to "earnings" as defined by the prenuptial agreement. 
III. Appellant Fails to Show Error in the District Court's 
Discovery Ruling. 
Appellant appears to assert that the district court erred when it denied Appellant's 
motion to compel discovery relating to earnings subsequent to the parties' separation. The 
argument is unclear because Appellant fails to reference any particular order from which she 
16 
appeals. In any event, Appellant fails to show the district court abused its discretion. 
"Generally, the trial court is granted broad latitude in handling discovery matters." 
R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1079 (Utah 1997) (citing 
Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995)). This Court will "not find 
abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary 
basis for the trial court's rulings." Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996). In 
Shepherdv. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), plaintiff argued that the trial court 
erred by limiting the trial proceedings solely to the issue of whether the prenuptial agreement 
was valid and binding. This Court disagreed, holding: 
A trial court has broad discretion to determine the manner 
in which proceedings before it are conducted.. We will not 
interfere with a trial court's decision to limit proceedings unless 
the trial court abused its discretion. In the present case, the trial 
court limited testimony, for a period of time, to the question of 
the validity and enforceability of the prenuptial agreement. 
Since the validity and enforceability of the prenuptial agreement 
was a central issue as to how the court would determine the 
value and distribution of the marital estate, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in limiting testimony and evidence to that 
question. 
Id. at 432. 
Here, Appellant moved to compel discovery of Appellee's earnings subsequent to the 
date of the parties' separation. See Motion to Compel (R. 1308-10). Appellee objected on 
the basis that the inquiry was irrelevant because, under California law, "[t]he earnings and 
accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the 
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spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of 
the spouse." Obj. and Memo, in Opp. to Motion to Compel, p. 3 (quoting Cal.Fam.Code 
§771) (R.1410). The district court agreed with Appellee: 
The court denies the motion to compel. The court hereby 
determines that California law will govern the property 
settlement in this case. The court is persuaded that California 
law does not allow earnings after a couple stops living together 
to be treated as community property. The prenuptial agreement 
does not expressly, nor by fair implication of the meaning of any 
provision thereof, alter the application of this aspect of 
California law. Wife is only entitled to property that derives 
from marital earnings. It is therefore appropriate that earnings 
and property after December 31, 2005, be off limits to 
discovery. 
Ruling on Motion to Compel, p. 1 (R.1527). 
Appellant makes no mention of this ruling, and fails to describe precisely why she 
believes the district court abused its discretion therein. Instead, Appellant simply reasserts 
her incorrect legal argument - that, despite the clear language of the governing California 
statute, the district court should have allowed discovery as to post-separation earnings. 
As Appellee argued below, Section X of the prenuptial agreement provides that it 
"shall be subject to and interpreted under the laws of the State of California." See prenuptial 
agreement, p. 42. California law provides that the community interest in any earnings ends 
on separation. See Cal.Fam.Code §771 ("The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and 
the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate and 
apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."). Because the parties 
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separated in late 2005, Appellant had no right to discover anything "earned" by Appellee in 
2006 or 2007; such information was irrelevant. 
Appellant cites anew to In re Marriage of Geraci, 144 Cal.App. 4th 1278 (Cal.App. 
2nd. Dist, 2006), to support her argument that post-separation earnings are community 
property. In Geraci, the court addressed the "inherent tension" between the rule that a 
community property business should be valued as of the date of trial and the rule that a 
spouse's earnings after separation are his or her separate property. Id. at 1290 (emphasis 
added). The court felt it was inequitable to value a community property business at the date 
of trial when the post-separation efforts of one spouse had "greatly increased the community 
estate which must then be divided with the other spouse." Id. (citation omitted). The court 
held that "because earnings and accumulations following separation are the spouse's 
separate property, it follows that the community interest should be valued as of the date of 
separation-the cutoff date for the acquisition of community assets." Id. at 1291 (emphasis 
added). 
This holding undermines Appellant's argument. In Geraci, there was never an issue 
as to the categorization of post-separation earnings which are clearly the separate property 
of the spouse who earned them. The language that Appellant cites from Geraci relates to the 
valuation of a "community property business," not post-separation earnings. Id. at 1290. 
Section 2552 has no impact whatsoever on the classification or valuation of post-separation 
earnings which are unambiguously defined as separate property pursuant to Section 771. In 
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addition, the argument that the phrase "from and after the date of marriage" somehow trumps 
California law that post-separation earnings are separate property is without any basis. 
These arguments were presented to the district court, which correctly held that, under 
the clear California statute, post-separation earnings were irrelevant and therefore not 
discoverable. Appellant is unable to show the district court abused its discretion in this 
regard. 
Appellant makes a second argument, that the district court's ruling was erroneous as 
a matter of Utah law since such earnings "bear on the determination of alimony." Appellant 
has failed to show where this argument was preserved below. In any event, post-separation 
earnings were irrelevant to the district court's alimony determination. "The fundamental 
purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a 
public charge." Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App.1990) 
(quotations and citation omitted). "In determining whether to award alimony and in setting 
the amount, a trial court must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity 
of the recipient spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; and, the length 
of the marriage." Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, f 26, 9 P.3d 171 (quotations and 
citations omitted); see also Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, \ 4, 153 P.3d 827. "If these 
factors have been considered, we will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such 
a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Childs v. Childs, 
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967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App.1998) (quotations and citations omitted). 
Utah Code section 30-3-5(8) provides certain factors a district court shall consider 
when making alimony determinations. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8). The district court 
specifically analyzed each such factor. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ [ 46-
71, pp. 17-23 (R. 2363-69). The district court determined that "[Appellee] has stipulated to 
the Court that he can afford any reasonable alimony award, thus fulfilling the Court's inquiry 
into the third factor." Id, f 49. 
This finding, which is not challenged on appeal, is dispositive. Where Appellee 
concedes that he can and will pay whatever reasonable alimony is awarded, no purpose is 
served by requiring him to disclose post-separation earnings. See Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d at 
243 ("Plaintiff...claims the court erred by refusing to allow full discovery of defendant's 
current financial condition. We find no merit in this argument, as defendant conceded that 
his present income was eight times that at the time of the divorce... No purpose would have 
been served by providing any more detailed information.") The purpose of alimony is to 
"enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage," id. at 242; the disclosure of Appellee's post-separation earnings adds 
nothing to this analysis. 
Accordingly, Appellant shows no error committed by the district court. 
IV. and V. Appellant's Arguments Relating to Standard of Living 
Expenses and Alimony Adjustment Fail Due to Failure to 
Challenge the Underlying Factual Findings. 
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Appellant argues in sections IV and V of her brief that the district court erred when 
it determined the amount of the alimony award, urging in each case that her version of the 
facts should have been accepted. See Brief of Appellant, p. 42, 44-45. Because 
Appellant has failed to properly attack the district court's factual findings, these 
arguments are insufficient to establish reversible error. 
Appellant's first argument is simple enough: Appellant's factual allegations 
regarding her monthly monetary requirements should have been accepted by the court. 
Appellant's second argument is more difficult to follow. Appellant initially suggests the 
district court should have determined that additional alimony was proper pursuant to Utah 
Code section 30-3-5(8)(a)(vii) (relating to educational expenses). However, Appellant 
fails to give any reason why this section would apply, given the fact that Appellee's 
"education" took place long ago and had no bearing on this case. See, e.g., Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 5, pp. 2-3 (R.2348-49) (noting that Appellee had already 
accumulated his wealth through business ventures prior to the parties' marriage). 
Appellant then suggests that the district court should have augmented her alimony award 
based on her allegations of "contributions" to post-separation earnings. In each argument, 
Appellant fails to make any citation to the record for the allegations she asserts. More 
importantly, Appellant fails to even reference the district court's findings as to alimony. 
The district court made numerous, detailed findings in regard to the amount of and 
the basis for the alimony award. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Tfij 52-68, 
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pp. 18-22 (R.2364-68). In the end, the district court even augmented the alimony award 
by allowing for a significant "cushion" should Appellant remarry. See id., ^ 69-71, pp. 
22-23 (R.2368-69). 
To successfully challenge these findings, Appellant "must marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus 
making them clearly erroneous." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (quotations and citations omitted). "Tf the appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law in the case.'" Id. (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 
199 (Utah 1991)). 
Plaintiff has made no effort to challenge the findings relating to alimony in the 
instant case, and has failed to marshal any evidence in support thereof.2 Simply 
reasserting a few facts, with no citation to the record, and no reference to the facts as 
determined by the district court, falls far short of meeting Appellant's burden: 
Again, to successfully challenge factual findings such 
2Indeed, the district court specifically rejected the testimony supplied by Appellant as to 
the amount necessary, finding that "this amount is exaggerated and does not accurately reflect the 
historic expenditures of the parties as documented in the evidence that was presented by both 
parties." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 156, p. 19 (R.2365). The district court also 
specifically noted Appellee's work at the Resort, but determined that, under the prenuptial 
agreement, this was deemed to be a gift. See id, % 52, p. 18 (R. 2364). 
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as these, an appellant must first marshal all of the evidence 
that supports the findings and then demonstrate that even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the district court, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the finding. In her brief, 
La Juana makes no effort to marshal the evidence in support 
of the voluntariness findings; in fact, she does not even 
mention the district court's findings. Instead, she simply 
reargues the facts. This approach is inappropriate. The district 
court is in the best position to weigh conflicting testimony, 
assess credibility, and from this make findings of fact. An 
appellate court does not lightly disturb the verdict of a jury or 
the factual findings of a trial court. Accordingly, absent a 
proper showing, we will not revisit the facts on appeal. 
Matter of Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). This 
Court may therefore assume that the record supports the district court's findings in regard 
to the amount of the alimony award. This assumption necessarily precludes Appellant's 
arguments. 
District courts have "considerable discretion in determining alimony ... and 
[determinations of alimony] will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion is demonstrated." Riley v. Riley, 2006 UT App 214, % 15, 138 P.3d 84 
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, <|[ 7, 76 P.3d 716 (alterations in original)). 
See also Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ^ 9, 169 P.3d 754 ("We will review the 
trial court's decisions regarding child support and alimony under the abuse of discretion 
standard."). 
Appellant's two arguments relating to the district court's alimony award fail to 
show an abuse of discretion. Thus, Appellant has once again failed to provide any reason 
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to disturb the district court's determination. 
VI and VII. Appellant is Unable to Show the District Court Abused its 
Discretion Regarding its Attorney Fee Determinations. 
Appellant argues that the district court erred when it (1) awarded Appellee his 
attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the prenuptial agreement, and (2) ordered Appellant 
to pay a portion of her own fees incurred below. Appellant is unable to show that the 
district court abused its discretion with regard to either determination. 
"The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the 
sound discretiou of the trial court." Riley, 2006 UT App 214, f 15 (quoting Childs v. 
Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App.1998). This determination is reviewed for abuse 
of that discretion. See Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(overruled on other grounds by Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 2 P.3d 442). A district 
court abuses its discretion "if there is no reasonable basis for the decision." Langeland v. 
Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998). 
The district court's determinations regarding attorney fees were predicated on 
numerous findings, see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ]ffl 72-85, pp. 24-27 
(R.2370-73), including the following: 
72. There are two attorney fee issues in this case: 
(1) should Hope be required to reimburse Robert for all or 
part of the attorney fees that he has advanced for her pursuant 
to the Order of this Court; and (2) has either party prevailed in 
a dispute arising out of the terms, conditions, and obligations 
imposed by the Agreement, thus entitling them to recover 
their attorney fees under paragraph Z of the Agreement. 
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73. The Court informed Hope on several occasions, 
in order to ensure that it was clear to her, that it may require 
her to reimburse Robert for the attorney fees that he was 
required to advance to her. The Court also permitted Robert 
to challenge the reasonableness of any fees billed by Hope's 
counsel. The Court ordered Robert to pay Hope's reasonable 
attorney fees to ensure that hope had an opportunity to present 
her best case to the Court and that she not be overwhelmed by 
Robert's resources. 
74. Through June 30, 2007, Hope incurred litigation 
expenses of $120,000 of which Robert has paid $80,000 and 
disputed $40,000. At the close of trial, the Court ordered 
Robert to pay the disputed fees which he has done. 
75. Through August 28, 2007, Robert had incurred 
litigation expenses of $124,000 just in securing a 
determination of the validity and enforcement of the 
Agreement. 
76. The Court finds that Hope's fees were 
reasonable and that her position was not so untenable that she 
should be required to cover all of her own fees. 
77. The Court finds that Hope has approximately 
$35,000.00 in a securities account that was gifted to her by 
Robert during the course of the marriage as well as the 
alimony that she will be receiving from Robert. At the 
inception of this case, Hope did not have the resources to 
match Robert's efforts without assistance that the Court finds 
is no longer needed. The Court finds that Hope shall be 
required to use the funds in her security account along with 
her income, if needed, to cover at a minimum $30,000 of her 
own fees, plus whatever amount her fees since June 30, 2007, 
exceed $30,000. 
78. The Court finds that Robert shall not be 
required to pay any further litigation expenses of Hope and, if 
Hope's litigation expenses incurred since June 30, 2007 are 
less than $30,000, Robert shall be entitled to a refund of the 
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difference. 
79. The Court finds that Robert is the prevailing 
party in the dispute arising out of the terms, conditions, and 
obligations imposed by paragraph [Z] of the prenuptial 
Agreement. 
80. The Court finds that Hope's claims for 
community property were based first on her efforts to 
invalidate the Agreement, second on her claim that she was 
co-owner of the Resort, and third, that she was entitled to one-
half of Robert's distributions from Flat Iron Mesa and one-
half of the operation cash flow of the Resort. 
81. The Court finds that Hope has failed to establish 
any of these claims and cannot be considered the prevailing 
party in the aspects of this dispute that involved the 
Agreement. 
82. The Court finds that Robert is the prevailing 
party and in accordance with paragraph Z of the Agreement, 
the Court must award Robert his fees incurred in connection 
with the dispute over the application of the Agreement. 
84. The Court finds that Robert is entitled to 
recover these fees from Hope by deducting $5,000 from each 
month's alimony payment and that the award of fees shall 
bear interest at the rate of 6.99% per annum from October 1, 
2007 until paid in full. 
85. The Court recognizes that allowing Robert to 
deduct $5,000 per month from awarded alimony of $15,000 
per month will mean that Hope will not receive enough 
money to maintain her at the standard of living she enjoyed 
during the marriage. Hope will naturally have to curtail her 
living standard but will still be able to maintain a comfortable 
lifestyle. This temporary curtailment is the natural 
consequence of her decision to pursue a claim for community 
property when the clear intention of the Agreement she signed 
before marrying was to sharply limit the creation of 
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community property. That same Agreement requires that the 
prevailing party in a dispute over the effect of the agreement 
recovers attorney fees. To increase alimony so Hope can pay 
those fees would make that portion of the Agreement 
meaningless. 
Id. Appellant makes no effort to challenge these findings, and this Court may therefore 
assume that the record supports the district court's findings. See Shepherd v. Shepherd, 
876 P.2d at 431; Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d at 199. 
The district court further explained its ruling relating to Appellant's attorney fees 
as follows: 
With respect to [this] issue, the court promised, when it 
originally required Robert to pay Hope's attorney fees, that it 
may require her to reimburse him. It was important to ensure 
that Hope had an opportunity to present her best case to the 
court and that she not be overwhelmed by Robert's resources. 
Hope incurred litigation expenses of $120,000 through June 
30, 2007. Robert had paid $80,000 of those fees and disputed 
$40,000. At the close of trial, the court instructed Robert to 
pay those fees.... The theory on which Utah law permits a 
court to require one party to a divorce to advance the fees of 
the other is to permit each side an equal opportunity to present 
its case. Hope did not have the resources to match Robert's 
effort without assistance. However, she did have 
approximately $35,000 in her securities account from gifts 
Robert made during the course of the marriage. The court 
should have required her to use that account at lest in 
substantial part. The court will require that Hope pay $30,000 
of her own fees, plus whatever amount her fees since June 30, 
3007, exceed $30,000. In other words, Robert shall not be 
required to pay any litigation expense incurred by Hope after 
June 30, 2007, and, if those expenses are less than $30,000, 
the difference shall be refunded to Robert. 
Sept. 14, 2007 Memorandum Decision, pp. 25-26 (R.2253-54). 
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Appellant filed a postjudgment motion relating to the award of attorney fees, 
which was granted in part (namely, a reduction of alimony to pay for Appellee's fees 
from $5,000 to $2,500 per month, see Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion 
to Amend and Denying a New Trial, p. 2 (R.2542)) and denied in part (as to Appellant's 
request for payment of her own fees): 
[T]he motion should be granted to the extent of 
decreasing the monthly payment of the awarded attorney fees 
that the Respondent should make to the Petitioner by 
reduction in her alimony from $5,000.00 to $2,500.00 per 
month; that the request for attorney fees should be denied 
pursuant to the provision of Paragraph Z of the Prenuptial 
Agreement between the parties and the provisions of Section 
30-3-3(1), which authorizes the Court to order payment of 
costs and attorneys fees, which the Court had granted in part 
and ordered Petitioner to pay and not reimburse Respondent 
for a portion of her fees. 
The Court previously determined that the first 
$120,000 of Hope's fees were reasonable and does not 
reconsider that determination. However, Hope's lack of 
success on her property claims has affected the Court's 
evaluation of her claim for additional fees. The Court's 
decision does not involve any application of Sections 30-3-
3(2) or (4), Utah Code. Were it to apply those sections, Hope 
might be required to reimburse a good share of the $120,000 
Robert has paid toward her fees. The Court also did not 
consider, in evaluating Hope's motion, that Robert paid 
$120,000 towards the purchase of a home for Petitioner and 
the minor child of the parties before she began to accrue any 
fees with her present counsel. 
Id, 
Appellant now argues that the district court erred when it awarded Appellee his 
29 
fees, assigning error to the fact that the district court strictly applied the attorney fee 
provision in the prenuptial agreement. Appellant also argues that the district court erred 
when it determined that Appellant should pay a portion of her own fees. Each of these 
arguments shall be addressed in turn. 
a. The District Court Correctly Interpreted the Prenuptial 
Agreement When it Awarded Appellee His Attorney Fees. 
There is no dispute that the prenuptial agreement was valid and binding on the 
parties. Such agreements are "construed and treated as contracts in general." Shepherd v. 
Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 431(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Furthermore, a court's award of 
attorney fees in light of a valid prenuptial agreement is not governed by equitable law, it is 
"controlled by the terms of the agreement governing challenges to its validity." Montoya v. 
Montoya, 909 A.2d 947, 956 (Conn. 2006); see also Pysell v. Keck, 559 S.E.2d 677, 678 
(Va. 2002) ("Antenuptial agreements, like marital properly settlements, are contracts 
subject to the rules of construction applicable to contracts generally, including the 
application of the plain meaning of unambiguous contractual terms."). 
This contract provided that the prevailing party in a dispute involving the 
Agreement "shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses." 
Prenuptial agreement, pg. 43 (emphasis added). The use of the term "shall" is "language 
of command" and thus implies a mandatory condition. Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 
728, 729 (Utah 1974). Therefore, the district court was required to award fees to the 
prevailing party, Appellee. 
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Rather than address the district court's findings, Appellant argues that the district 
court erred when it determined it was compelled to apply the prenuptial agreement in this 
manner. Appellant cites no authority supporting her position that a district court must 
make additional findings before enforcing the terms of a valid contract. Instead, Appellant 
argues without basis that public policy requires further investigation. This argument is 
inadequate to overturn the district court's determination. 
For instance, Appellant cites the Utah Premarital Agreement Act for the proposition 
that parties may contract with respect to "any other matter, including their personal rights 
and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal penalty." 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-4(1 )(g). However, there is no authority provided that an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to the express terms of a contract violates any public policy. 
Instead, Appellant's argument begs the question that is left unanswered - what violation of 
public policy occurred in this instance? 
Appellant cites to the "important public policy such public policy of giving both 
parties the chance to present their claims." Appellant's Brief, p. 46. However, Appellant 
ignores the fact that the district court specifically ordered Appellee to pay all of 
Appellant's attorney fees through June 30, 2007, to ensure that Appellant had an equal 
opportunity to present her case. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f^ 73 
(R.2370). 
Appellant also cites to a Colorado case, In re Marriage oflkelar, 161 P.3d 663 
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(Colo. 2007), for the proposition that an unconscionable prenuptial agreement need not be 
enforced. The court in Ikelar was concerned with ensuring that both sides have adequate 
resources to effectively litigate the case, not the enforceability of a valid agreement. Id. at 
670-71. Thus, the district court's determination was consistent with Ikelar. In any event, 
Appellant has set forth no argument as to why the prenuptial agreement is 
"unconscionable" and fails to raise any facts that could support such an argument. 
Indeed, this is contrary to the district court's determination that the prenuptial agreement 
was valid and enforceable. See Ruling on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R.1029-
34). 
In the end, the law allows parties to a prenuptial agreement to agree to all matters 
not in violation of public policy. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-4. Appellant has failed to 
make any showing that the prenuptial agreement violated any particular public policy, or 
that the district court erred when it interpreted and enforced that agreement. 
b. Appellant Shows No Abuse of Discretion Relating to the 
District Court's Determination That Appellant Should Pay a 
Portion of Her Own Attorney Fees. 
Next, Appellant argues that the district court erred when it ordered her to pay a 
portion of her own attorney fees incurred below. Appellant argues that this decision is 
somehow inconsistent with section 30-3-3, and that the district court did not make required 
findings under this section. 
This argument is misguided for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that this 
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determination, as set forth above, was not based on interpretation of section 30-3-3. See 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Amend, p. 2 (R.2542). Instead, the 
determination that Appellant must pay a portion of her own fees was based on the 
prenuptial agreement and the fact that Appellant was not the "prevailing party" in the 
underlying action. See id. Appellant does not argue that the prenuptial agreement was 
incorrectly interpreted, and certainly does not argue she was a prevailing party below. 
In addition, this argument fails under the plain terms of section 30-3-3, which 
provides in relevant part: 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 
Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or Title 78B, 
Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court 
may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness 
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable 
the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-
time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a 
domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees 
upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon 
the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is 
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1), (2) (emphasis added). This section "grants courts discretion 
to award attorney fees in domestic cases. Trial courts have discretion to award fees, so 
long as the award is based on findings regarding the need of the receiving spouse, the 
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ability of the payor spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the fees." Schaumberg v. 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
It is undisputed that the district court did, in fact, award Appellant $120,000 in 
attorney fees in order to "prosecute or defend the action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1). 
See Sept. 14, 2007 Memorandum Decision, pp. 25-26 (R.2253-54). Thus, Appellant 
cannot (and does not) argue that the district court erred in some fashion under subsection 
30-3-3(1). 
Moreover, subsection 30-3-3(2) was not even applicable because the district court 
determined that Appellant was not "the party [that] substantially prevailed upon the claim 
or defense." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2); see also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Tf 81 (R.2372). Instead, the district court utilized its discretion when it allowed 
Appellant her fees up to $120,000, but refused to grant fees in excess of that amount. 
Appellant fails to show that this constitutes an abuse of discretion. Indeed, the district 
court had warned Appellant early on that this might, in fact, be the result: 
He'll pay the attorney fees, but you need to understand 
this is just for now, and this is just to ensure that she has an 
opportunity to fairly litigate. But there is no reason why you 
shouldn't think that in the end I will not give him credit against 
everything he's required to pay her for everything he has 
already paid, including her attorneys' fees. 
See November 17, 2006 Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, pp. 167-68 (R. 2554). Because 
the district court determined that Appellant was not the prevailing party, there was no 
reason for the court to ensure that "the award is based on findings regarding the need of 
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the receiving spouse, the ability of the payor spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the 
fees." Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 604. See Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 931 ("Because 
Taylor's motions were denied in their entirety, she was not entitled to an award of costs or 
fees, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees or 
costs to Taylor under section 30-3-3.") (citing Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 427 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990)) (emphasis added). 
In any event, Appellant's argument fails because the district court made sufficient 
findings. In regard to ability to pay and need of the receiving spouse, the district court 
determined that Appellee "has stipulated to the Court that he can afford any reasonable 
alimony award," see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f^ 49 (R.2364), and 
determined that Appellant had "$35,000 in her securities account from gifts Robert made 
during the course of the marriage. The court should have required her to use that account 
at lest in substantial part." Sept. 14, 2007 Memorandum Decision, pp. 25-26 (R.2253-54). 
In addition, the district court noted that "the first $120,000 of Hope's fees were reasonable 
and does not reconsider that determination. However, Hope's lack of success on her 
property claims has affected the Court's evaluation of her claim for additional fees." 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Amend, p. 2 (R.2542). Thus, even 
if subsection 30-3-3(2) applied here, Appellant's argument that insufficient findings were 
made, or that such findings do not support the district court's conclusion are unfounded. 
In sum, Appellant fails to show the district court abused its discretion when it 
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awarded Appellee his attorney fees pursuant to the prenuptial agreement or when it 
ordered Appellant to pay a portion of her own fees. 
Request for Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal 
Appellee was awarded attorney fees below as the "prevailing party" pursuant to the 
terms of the parties' prenuptial agreement. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
1fl[ 79-85 (R.2371-73). Appellee is therefore entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
See Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, If 39, 30 P.3d 436 ( "When a party who received 
attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred 
on appeal." (Internal quotations and citation omitted.)). 
Appellee hereby requests an award of his attorney fees incurred on appeal, and 
requests remand to the district court for a determination of such fees. 
Conclusion 
Appellant fails to meet her burden on appeal. She is unable to show any error 
committed by the district court, let alone reversible error. Accordingly, Appellee 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's determinations and award 
his attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
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DATED this 2.7 0 day of January, 2009. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
David S. Do/owitz 
Bradley M. Strassberg 
Joshua K. Peterman 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
u 
I hereby certify that, on this J2 ?day of January, 2009,1 caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Appellees' Brief via First Class Mail, postage fully pre-
paid, to the following: 
Kenneth A. Okazaki 
Stephen C. Clark 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, IJT 84101 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 1 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899) 
DENA C. SARANDOS (Bar No. 6028) 
JOSHUA K. PETERMAN (Bar No. 10248) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
257 East 200 South, Suite 700 
P.O.Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Facsimile (801) 355-1813 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KEITH LEVIN, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
: Civil No. 05 470 0107 
v. : 
: Judge: Lyle R. Anderson 
HOPE M. CARLTON-LEVIN : 
Respondent. 
This matter came regularly before the Court for a three-day bench trial before the 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on September 5-7, 2007. Petitioner was present and 
represented by his counsel David S. Dolowitz and Joshua K. Peterman. Respondent was 
present and represented by her counsel Kenneth A. Okazaki and Andrew G. Deiss. The 
JONES WALDO 
OCT 1 9 2007 
RECEIVED 
1 
Court, having heard the testimony of the parties and witnesses for and on behalf of the 
parties, and having considered the exhibits admitted into evidence during the course of the 
trial and having considered the opinions of expert witnesses testifying on behalf of the parties 
and being fully advised in the premises and having issued its Memorandum Decision on 
September 14, 2007, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Petitioner and the Respondent were both residents of Grand County, 
State of Utah, and had been so for three months prior to the filing of the above-entitled 
action on December 22, 2005. 
2. Robert Keith Levin and Hope Marie Carlton Levin were married on 
September 14, 1991 in the State of California. 
3. Each of the parties has asked the Court to end their marriage on the 
ground that they have irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that the parties do have 
irreconcilable differences which make continuation of their marriage impossible and each 
is entitled to a divorce from the other. 
4. One child has been born as issue of this marriage, Calliway Jo, Age 10, 
bom February 10, 1997. 
5. At the time of the marriage, Robert had accumulated assets worth over ten 
million dollars. He had accumulated his wealth primarily in the women's apparel 
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industry. At the date of marriage, Robert was completing his obligation to work for 
Kellwood, the company to which he had sold his women's apparel business. 
6. At the time of the marriage, Hope was twenty-five (25) years old. She had 
enjoyed some success in the film, television, and advertising industry as a model and 
actress, but had certainly not become a star. She had acted in some obscure films, and her 
television appearances were sporadic. The highest amount that Hope earned in one year 
before she married Robert was $44,000.00 in 1989. 
7. Being concerned about protecting his present assets, future investments and 
future business activities, Petitioner insisted that the parties negotiate and enter into a 
prenuptial agreement. 
8. Before marrying, Robert and Hope signed a prenuptial agreement 
("Agreement") which the Court determined on summary judgment was valid and 
enforceable. The evidence presented at trial reinforces the Court's determination that the 
Agreement is valid and enforceable. 
9. Both Robert and Hope were represented by capable counsel in negotiating 
the prenuptial agreement and there were negotiations back and forth that resulted in a 
final agreement that reflected input from both Hope and Robert. 
10. For three or four months after the wedding, Robert continued to receive 
salary and residual payments from Kellwood. He testified his salary, under the prenuptial 
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agreement, was community income and it was consumed as community support and the 
Court finds this is correct under the prenuptial agreement and applicable California law. 
11. At the time Robert finally terminated from Kellwood, he received a final 
buyout payment of approximately two (2) million dollars ($2,000,000.00) which, under 
the prenuptial agreement remained his separate property. 
12. Shortly after they married, Robert and Hope moved to Park City, Utah 
where they lived a luxurious leisure lifestyle which included frequent houseboating trips 
at Lake Powell. 
13. Although living in Utah may have impeded development of Hope's career, 
she was free to travel to other areas of the country to take advantage of any career 
opportunities. 
14. In 1994, Robert purchased ranch property adjacent to the Colorado River in 
Grand County, Utah. Robert and Hope moved to the ranch and began to develop it with 
the intent to make it a destination resort. 
15. The ranch was purchased for $800,000.00 but Robert invested 
approximately twelve million Dollars ($12,000,000.00) of his separate property including 
some borrowed money in the development of the ranch. The ranch was named Sorrel 
River Ranch Resort ("Resort"). 
16. The process of transforming the ranch to a destination resort was difficult 
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and both parties worked to effect the transformation. While the parties worked to build 
the Resort, they also enjoyed numerous amenities at the resort. Hope was able to pursue 
her love of horses as well as take advantage of the Resort's pool, spa, and dining room as 
these amenities were developed. 
17. One of the benefits of living and working at the Resort is that many of the 
parties' living expenses were covered by the business, in exchange for having the parties 
readily accessible to work in the business. 
18. Robert elected to run the Resort through a limited liability company called 
Levinius, L.L.C. ("Levinius"). The land on which the Resort is located is owned by other 
Utah partnerships which are in turn owned by Levinius. 
19. Robert has sole control of the Resort through his control of Levinius. 
Neither Levinius or any of the properties or entities through which the Resort is operated 
were ever in Hope's name; title always remained in Robert's name. 
20. There are no written agreements granting Hope an ownership interest in the 
Resort, Levinius, or any of the subsidiary companies. 
21. The Resort did not have any taxable earnings until 2005, when it reported 
taxable income of approximately $200,000.00 on revenues of approximately four point 
four million dollars ($4,400,000.00). Even after application of this 2005 income, 
Levinius had accumulated taxable losses of approximately two (2) million 
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($2,000,000.00) at the end of 2005. By this time, Levinius also had approximately three 
point six million ($3,600,000.00) of accumulated depreciation. 
22. Hope's spending habits were the source of regular arguments between Hope 
and Robert but the Court believes that Hope was generally able to purchase anything that 
she wanted. 
23. In 2003, Robert became a passive investor in a limited liability company 
that developed lots on Flat Iron Mesa in San Juan County, Utah. Robert was adamant 
that he was so consumed with the development of the Resort that he could devote 
virtually no time to the development of Flat Iron Mesa. 
24. John Ogden, the Managing Member of Flat Iron Mesa Partners, LLC did 
virtually all of the work related to the development of Flat Iron Mesa project. 
25. Under the investment agreement for the Flat Iron Mesa project, Robert 
received sixty per cent ( 60%) of the profits of the company and by the time that all of the 
lots had been sold in 2007, Robert had received profits of approximately one point five 
million ($1,500,000.00). 
Issues Presented at Trial 
26. The parties resolved by stipulation all of the issues relating to custody, 
parent time, and child support of their child Calli Jo. The Court approved this stipulation 
and its implementing Order, as written. A copy of this Stipulation and Order is attached 
6 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by reference. 
27. The issues at trial were: (1) was there a breach of the Agreement that 
would invalidate the Agreement; (2) the existence and amount of community 
property;(3) the approximate amount and duration of alimony; and (4) attorney fees. 
28. The premarital agreement (Exhibit 6) is extensive and detailed. It provides 
that it is to be interpreted pursuant to California law. Alimony is expressly excluded from 
the Agreement and shall be awarded pursuant to Utah law. 
Specific Findings of Fact In Regard to Each Issue Presented 
A. COMMUNITY PROPERTY: 
Alleged Breach of the Premarital Agreement 
29. The Court finds that there was no breach of the Agreement that would result 
in an invalidation of the Agreement. Hope alleged several facts in support of her claim 
that the Agreement should be invalidated; however, none of the instances, even if proven, 
are sufficient to warrant an invalidation of the Agreement. Even if established, the Court 
would be required to apply the rule that a contract is not invalidated except for a 
substantial breach and none of the failures to perform alleged by Hope constitute such a 
breach. 
a. Taxes-Paragraph O of the Agreement imposes on Robert the duty to 
report his income on federal and state tax returns. Hope alleged that 
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the deductions claimed by Robert on his tax returns raise a question 
whether Robert satisfied this obligation. However, also in paragraph 
O, Robert promises to indemnify Hope against any claims, 
assessment, deficiencies, interest, penalties, fees, and costs 
attributable to his income arising out of any filed tax return. This 
specific remedy is the remedy available to Hope, not invalidation of 
the Agreement. 
b. Insurance-Paragraph P of the Agreement imposes on Robert the duty 
to maintain $250,000.00 of life insurance on himself naming Hope as 
the beneficiary as long as they are married and living together. 
Robert satisfied this obligation. This paragraph also requires Robert 
to notify Hope before cancelling the insurance. Robert has cancelled 
the policy since separation but did not notify Hope that he had done 
so. However, this paragraph provides the specific remedy for this 
failure. Robert essentially became an insurer of his life and would 
have been required to pay $250,000.00 to Hope if he died without 
insurance in force. This specific remedy trumps the general remedy 
of invalidating the agreement. Obviously, now that Hope knows that 
the insurance has been cancelled, it is her responsibility to secure 
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replacement coverage if desired. Robert's only duty will be to 
cooperate with that process. 
c. Good Faith and Fair Dealing-Hope alleged that Robert manipulated 
his activities and the financial statements of his companies and the 
payment or non-payment of salary to prevent the accumulation of 
community property and that he had to work in ways that created 
community property. Hope's argument is undermined by Paragraph 
F.2 of the Agreement which permits Robert to pursue any vocation, 
occupation or profession. Hope failed to persuade the Court that 
Robert manipulated any opportunity to receive salary. The Court 
finds that it was reasonable for Robert to work at the Resort without 
compensation as long as the Resort was not profitable. Even after 
the Resort became profitable, it was reasonable for Robert to wait 
until he had received a return on his initial capital investment before 
paying himself a salary. Even though neither Robert or Hope ever 
received a salary from the Resort, they each received extensive and 
substantial benefits from living at the Resort. 
d. Fiduciary Duty-The Agreement is clear that a fiduciary duty exists 
only when community property exists. The Court finds that there 
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was and is no community property and therefore, Robert had no 
fiduciary duty to Hope. 
Partnership 
30. The Court finds that Hope has presented no agreement signed by Robert 
which makes her a partner in any of his business enterprises. The prenuptial agreement 
provides that community property comes into existence only as the Agreement provides. 
Paragraph D.3 clearly provides that Robert's separate property becomes community 
property only if a document of tide so indicates and Robert clearly acknowledges the 
relinquishment of a one-half interest in the property. No evidence of such a document 
was produced and Robert testified no such document had ever been created or executed. 
Hope did not contradict this testimony. 
31. The Court finds that Hope's claim that she became a partner in Robert's 
separate property via verbal conduct is not credible nor supported by law. Hope 
presented evidence that Robert talked to her on several occasions to tell her she must 
conduct herself as an "owner." Robert denies these conversations ever took place and 
that he and Hope frequently argued about her lack of ownership. Hope also presented a 
video clip of a television show featuring the Resort which described her as "co-owner." 
32. The Court is aware of no authority that creates an ownership interest simply 
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because third parties believe such ownership exists. The theory of partnership by 
estoppel, as asserted by Hope, cannot be used to create a partnership interest. The 
purpose of this theory is to protect creditors who relied on representations that they were 
dealing with a partnership. Additionally, the Agreement expressly provides in paragraph 
W.2 that the use of such expressions such as "our property," "our house," "our bank 
account," or other similar phrases does not alter the characterization of separate property. 
33. Hope presented the testimony of Stuart Berman who briefly held an 
ownership interest in the Resort. Mr. Berman testified that all discussions between him 
and Robert included the implicit assumption that Hope was a co-owner of Robert's 
interest. The Court finds that Mr. Berman's testimony is not credible. His testimony is 
undermined by his obvious anger at Robert, which persists even though he made 
$475,000.00 on an investment of $1,721,000.00 in just eight (8) months. His testimony is 
also seriously undermined by the actual language of the agreements between himself and 
Robert that Mr. Berman had drafted. Hope appears in only one of these agreements, and 
only in the capacity of a consenting spouse, which a careful California lawyer would 
require when dealing with a married man who insists his wife has no ownership interest. 
The Court finds that it is obvious that Mr. Berman knew that Hope was not a co-owner. 
34. The Court also finds that Hope's argument that her putative ownership 
interest in Levinius is unaffected by the Agreement's requirement of a writing because 
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Levinius is not a party to the Agreement is without merit. Robert is a party to this action 
and is entitled to the protection of the Agreement 
35. The Court finds that Hope's claim that she became a partner of Robert's 
entities by virtue of a verbal agreement is rejected because (1) the Agreement expressly 
requires a written agreement to create a partnership; and (2) Hope's claims that a verbal 
agreement was made are not credible. 
Earnings 
36. The Agreement, paragraphs D and F. 1 reverses the presumption under 
California law that any income resulting from the efforts of a husband or wife during 
marriage, and any property acquired with that income, is community property. Instead, all 
income, and all property acquired with that income, is separate property unless the 
Agreement provides otherwise. 
37. Subparagraph D. 1 of the Agreement provides that earnings are governed by 
paragraph F. Subparagraph F. 1 of the Agreement provides that earnings from personal 
services, skills, efforts, talents, or work are separate property, except as the Agreement 
specifically provides. Subparagraph F.2 of the Agreement creates a community property 
right in the "earnings" or "base salary" derived from actual effort or employment of 
Robert. Earnings or base salary are defined as compensation for labor or services 
performed by Robert, but do not include any benefits associated with such earnings or 
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base salary. 
38. The only earnings or base salary derived from actual efforts of Robert were 
paid to him during the first four months following the marriage and were promptly 
consumed on community expenses, thus leaving no community property. 
39. Subparagraph F.3 of the Agreement provides that: 
In the event [Robert] enters into any type of business venture or ventures 
from and after the date of marriage from which [Robert] will receive 
earnings or salary therefrom (regardless of whether such earnings or salary 
have been derived from actual effort or services performed by [Robert] for 
or on behalf of the business venture), such earnings or salary, derived from 
such business venture or ventures, shall be community property. For 
purposes of this paragraph f.3, the term "earnings" or "salary" derived from 
said business venture or ventures excludes pension and deferred income 
contributions, stock, stock options, bonuses, benefits and rights and 
perquisites, which items shall remain [Robert's] separate property subject to 
Paragraphs F.5, F.6, and F.7. It is the parties intention that all property 
acquired with such "earnings" or "salary" (defined under this Paragraph 
F.3) shall be community property unless the parties agree otherwise in 
writing. 
40. The parties dispute the meaning of the term "earnings" as used in F.3. 
Robert maintains that the inclusion of the phrase "whether such earnings or salary have 
been derived from actual effort or services performed by Robert for or on behalf of the 
business venture" simply loosens the requirement that Robert actually perform services 
for his business venture to make his earnings or salary community property and the term 
"earnings" still has the customary meaning under California law. California law defines 
earnings as salary or wages of a person received because of services provided. Hope 
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maintains that the term "earnings" as used in F.3 includes any and all profits allocated to 
Robert from Flat Iron Mesa and the Resort. 
41. This Court is required to read the Agreement as a whole in order to 
determine the meaning and intent of the parties and to harmonize its various provisions. 
Therefore, Subparagraph F.3 must be interpreted in light of the following provisions of 
the Agreement: 
a. Subparagraph F.4 which defines Kellwood payments, except salary, 
as separate property. 
b- Subparagraph F.5 which creates a community property right in 
bonuses received by Robert as an employee under limited 
circumstances. The Court finds that none of these limited 
circumstances apply. 
c. Subparagraph F.6 which provides an additional community property 
right in bonuses based on the duration of the marriage. The Court 
finds that there were no bonuses paid to Robert that would invoke 
this subparagraph. 
d. Subparagraph F.7 which provides a community property right in 
pension payments based on longevity of the marriage. The Court 
finds that Robert has not received any pension payments. 
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e. Subparagraph F.8 excludes any community property participation in 
stock options or dividends. 
f. Subparagraph F.9 which provides that earnings or salary from joint 
business ventures are community property, but joint business 
ventures must be established by written agreement. The Court finds 
that there were no joint business ventures. 
g. Paragraph I of the Agreement provides that all profits, rents, 
increase, appreciation and income from Robert's separate property 
are also his property. A change in the form of Robert's separate 
property does not change the characterization of that property. If 
Robert sells separate property and purchases other property, that new 
property is also Robert's separate property. 
h. Paragraph J of the Agreement provides that devoting time, skill or 
effort to separate property does not change it to community property. 
42. The Court finds that Hope's asserted meaning of the term "earnings" as 
used in subparagraph F.3 to mean any kind of profit from any business venture to be 
incorrect. The Court accepts Robert's interpretation as valid under California law and 
finds that the term "earnings" means payments based at least in theory on services, such 
as actual salary, guaranteed payments to a member in a limited liability company, or 
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draws to a partner in an operating business partnership. Any other interpretation would 
be in conflict with the remainder of the Agreement and render it superfluous. The Court 
finds it hard to believe that Robert went to the trouble of obtaining such a comprehensive 
and detailed prenuptial agreement so that he could ensure that Hope could claim one-half 
of the profits from any business venture in which he would become involved. 
43. Hope also attempted to persuade the Court that Robert was actively engaged 
in the management of Flat Iron Mesa. The Court rejects this argument and finds that 
Robert had virtually no active involvement in Flat Iron. He was a passive investor. Even 
if the Court were to adopt Hope's argument however, there would still not be any 
earnings as contemplated by the Agreement because it was Robert's capital investment, 
not his business efforts, that resulted in profits from Flat Iron. 
44. The Court finds that Robert did not receive any earnings or salary from the 
Resort or Flat Iron Mesa as contemplated by the Agreement and there is no community 
property. 
45. Although the Court finds that the Agreement is unambiguous and can be 
interpreted as a matter of law, even if the Court were to consider parol evidence, its 
interpretation of the term "earnings" would be the same. Robert testified that he always 
intended that Hope would only participate in his base salary and then in bonuses and 
pension payments in the limited circumstances set forth above. Robert specifically 
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remembers discussing the contents of F.3 and understanding it to mean that Hope would 
only participate in his wages, salary, or other similar payments resulting from any new 
active business he may start. Robert's interpretation of the term "earnings" is consistent 
with the overall expressed purpose of the Agreement. Hope had virtually no recollection 
of the specific provisions of the Agreement even though her attorney discussed the terms 
of the Agreement with her on numerous occasions. Hope's description of what she 
understood the Agreement to mean was general and did not appear to be based on any 
actual memory of the language of the Agreement or advice of her counsel. 
B. ALIMONY 
46. In making its alimony determination, the Court has considered: (1) the 
financial conditions and needs of Hope; (2) the ability of Hope to produce a sufficient 
income for herself; (3) the ability of Robert to provide support; (4) the length of the 
marriage; (5) whether Hope has custody of minor children requiring support; (6) whether 
the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and (7) 
whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's 
skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to 
attend school during the marriage. 
47. Although some evidence of fault was presented, the Court has not 
considered the fault of either of the parties in making its determination. 
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48. The Court finds that it need not reach a specific finding regarding the 
second factor because its alimony determination does not impute any income to Hope that 
would reduce the alimony award. 
49. Robert has stipulated to the Court that he can afford any reasonable alimony 
award, thus fulfilling the Court's inquiry into the third factor. 
50. The Court finds that alimony should be awarded for a duration consistent 
with the length of the parties' marriage subject to the conditions set forth below in 
paragraph 71, that is fourteen (14) years and three (3) months. 
51. The Court finds that Hope currently has primary physical custody of the 
parties' child and that the child's needs are met through the level of child support to 
which the parties have stipulated and agreed. The amount of the child support that the 
parties agreed to exceeds the guidelines set forth in the Utah Code and meets the actual 
needs of the child. If the parties agree that the child should attend private school, Robert 
should be responsible for paying reasonable tuition. 
52. The Court finds that Hope did work at the Resort which is owned and 
operated by Robert as his separate property. However, subparagraph J.3 of the 
Agreement specifically provides that the expenditure of time, effort, skill, and money by 
one party for the benefit of the separate property of the other party shall be deemed to be a 
gift to the other unless otherwise agreed to in writing. No such writing was ever created. 
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53. The Court finds that the financial conditions and needs of Hope to maintain 
Hope in the lifestyle to which she was accustomed during the marriage requires an 
alimony award of $15,000.00 per month subject to the conditions set forth below in 
paragraph 71. 
54. The Court has reached its alimony award by looking at the documented 
historic expenditures to approximate what monthly alimony payment will enable Hope to 
enjoy the standard of living that she enjoyed during the marriage. 
55. The Court finds that the parties spent approximately $9,000.00 per month 
on Hope's expenses before separation and after separation, Hope spent approximately 
$10,500.00 per month. 
56. Hope presented expert testimony from Richard Hoffman that her pre-
separation expenses were for luxuries and that her necessities were provided for as an 
incident to her living at the Resort. Mr. Hoffman testified that in order to restore her 
marital standard of living, Hope would need alimony of $ 19,707.00 per month. Mr. 
Hoffman also added to this figures $5,000.00 per month for income taxes, and $6,800.00 
per month to allow Hope to purchase and additional residence fpr $1,000,000.00. Thus, 
Hope demanded alimony of $30,000.00 per month but the Court finds that this amount is 
exaggerated and does not accurately reflect the historic expenditures of the parties as 
documented in the evidence that was presented by both parties. 
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57. The Court rejects that the $5,000.00 Robert gave Hope each of the last three 
(3) months pnor to separation represents any effort to match actual historic expenditures. 
Hope's expert substituted this $5,000.00 for the documented $1,800.00 in pre-separation 
monthly expenditures. The Court finds that the $1,800.00 accurately represent^Jhat 
parties' actual expenditures and accordingly reduces Mr. Hoffman's proposed budget by 
$3,200.00. 
58. The Court also rejects Mr. Hoffman's proposal that Hope be awarded 
alimony sufficient for her to afford a one million dollar ($1,000,000.00) residence. The 
Court finds that Hope's present residence is similar in appearance and quality to the 
residence in which she lives at the Resort. Accordingly, the Court reduces Hope's 
proposed budget by $6,800.00 which is the monthly amount that he had included for the 
purchase of a new home. 
59. The Court finds that Mr. Hoffman's proposed monthly bam expenses of 
$2,100.00 for three horses is overstated. Based on the actual documented expenditures 
related to caring for horses at the Resort, sometimes including these same horses, and 
recognizing the fact that there were economies of scale at the Resort that Hope may not 
now enjoy, the Court finds that Hope's bam expenses will be $600.00 per month. 
Accordingly, the Court reduces Hope's proposed budget by $1,500.00. 
60. The Court finds that Hope's proposed budget includes $550.00 per month 
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for private school tuition for the parties' child. The Court finds that the child does not 
currently attend private school and the Court cannot determine whether the child will 
need or want to attend private school in the future. The Court also finds that the child's 
tuition would not properly be treated as alimony but rather as child support and 
accordingly eliminates $550.00 from Hope's proposed budget. 
61. The Court also finds that because it is not imputing any income to Hope, 
thus requiring her to work outside the home, Hope does not require a housekeeper or 
nanny to match her marital standard of living. Since Hope no longer has duties at the 
Resort, she is able to maintain the property where she now lives without the need to hire 
any employees. The Court finds that this arrangement will not cause Hope to work any 
harder than she did during the marriage. Accordingly, the Court eliminates these figures 
from Hope's proposed budget. 
62. The Court also eliminates from Hope's proposed budget the $ 1,150.00 per 
month that she had allocated for "savings." The Court finds that the purpose of alimony 
is to permit the maintenance of a marital standard of living for a specified period after the 
termination of the marriage, not to allow the setting aside of a nest egg to maintain the 
marriage partner thereafter. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Robert 
regularly set aside any money for Hope's retirement during the marriage. 
63. Robert also presented a budget to the Court but the Court finds that 
21 
Robert's proposed budget understates certain expenses and makes certain assumptions 
that the Court rejects. 
64. The Court finds that although Robert may not have liked the fact that Hope 
received laser hair removal treatment and plastic surgery, Hope maintaining her 
appearance with surgical and similar procedures was a routine part of life for Hope. 
65. As the Court finds that Hope should not be required to work outside the 
home, it does not impute any income to Hope. 
66. The Court's best estimate of barn expenses is $600 per month. 
67. With the foregoing adjustments, and considering the actual expenditures of 
the parties during their marriage, the Court finds that Hope will require $12,000.00 per 
month after taxes to maintain her marital standard of living and thus found that she would 
need a monthly payment of $15,000.00. 
68. Neither parties' expert calculated the tax burden for alimony at this level. 
Mr. Hoffman estimated that the combined federal and state tax burden on $24,500.00 of 
monthly alimony was approximately twenty per cent (20%). Based on the calculation 
supplied by Hope's expert, the Court finds that monthly alimony of $15,000.00 should 
yield Hope $12,000.00 after taxes. 
69. The Court finds that Robert and Hope were married fourteen (14) years and 
(3) three months before separation, thus making the duration of alimony presumptively 
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fourteen years and three months. 
70. Alimony usually terminates on remarriage or cohabitation. Hope argued 
that special circumstances-her loss of a potentially rewarding career as a model and 
actress-warrant making the alimony non-terminable. The Court finds that it is hard to 
imagine anything more speculative than the future film or modeling career of someone 
who has not achieved "star" or "super model" status. However, the Agreement authorizes 
the Court to consider Hope's career as a factor in any aspect of alimony. 
71. The Court finds that in order to permit Hope to make a gradual adjustment 
to a different lifestyle if she should decide to remarry, as well as a cushion towards 
establishing a new career, alimony should last for five years even if Hope remarries or 
cohabits and that it should continue thereafter, even with remarriage or cohabitation, at a 
reduced level of $7,500.00 per month for five more years after which it will be 
eliminated. To clarify, if Hope remarries or cohabits before October 1, 2012, alimony 
will not be reduced or eliminated until October 1, 2012, when it will be reduced to 
$7,500.00, regardless of whether Hope is still remarried or cohabitating. If Hope 
remarries or cohabits after October 1, 2012, but before October 1, 2017, it will be reduced 
to $7,500.00 until October 1, 2017, when it will be eliminated regardless of whether Hope 
is still remarried or cohabitating. Remarriage or cohabitation after October 1, 2017 will 
cause an immediate elimination of alimony. 
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C. ATTORNEY FEES 
72. There are two attorney fee issues in this case: (1) should Hope be required 
to reimburse Robert for all or part of the attorney fees that he has advanced for her 
pursuant to the Order of this Court; and (2) has either party prevailed in a dispute arising 
out of the terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by the Agreement, thus entitling 
them to recover their attorney fees under paragraph Z of the Agreement. 
73. The Court informed Hope on several occasions, in order to ensure that it 
was clear to her, that it may require her to reimburse Robert for the attorney fees that he 
was required to advance to her. The Court also permitted Robert to challenge the 
reasonableness of any fees billed by Hope's counsel. The Court ordered Robert to pay 
Hope's reasonable attorney fees to ensure that hope had an opportunity to present her best 
case to the Court and that she not be overwhelmed by Robert's resources. 
74. Through June 30, 2007, Hope incurred litigation expenses of $120,000.00 
of which Robert has paid approximately $80,000.00 and disputed approximately 
$40,000.00. At the close of trial, the Court ordered Robert to pay the disputed fees which 
he has done. 
75. Through August 28, 2007, Robert had incurred litigation expenses of 
$124,000.00 just in securing a determination of the validity and enforcement of the 
Agreement. 
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76. The Court finds that Hope's fees were reasonable and that her position was 
not so untenable that she should be required to cover all of her own fees. 
77. The Court finds that Hope has approximately $35,000.00 in a securities 
account that was gifted to her by Robert during the course of the marriage as well as the 
alimony that she will be receiving from Robert. At the inception of this case, Hope did 
not have the resources to match Robert's efforts without assistance that the Court finds is 
no longer needed. The Court finds that Hope should be required to use the funds in her 
security account along with her income, if needed, to cover at a minimum $30,000 of her 
own fees, plus whatever amount her fees since June 30,2007, exceed $30,000. 
78. The Court finds that Robert should not be required to pay any further 
litigation expenses of Hope and, if Hope's litigation expenses incurred since June 30, 
2007 are less than $30,000.00, Robert should be entitled to a refund of the difference. 
79. The Court finds that Robert is the prevailing party in the dispute arising out 
of the terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by paragraph Z of the prenuptial 
Agreement. 
80. The Court finds that Hope's claims for community property were based first 
on her efforts to invalidate the Agreement, second on her claim that she was co-owner of 
the Resort, and third, that she was entitled to one-half of Robert's distributions from Flat 
Iron Mesa and one-half of the operation cash flow of the Resort. 
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81. The Court finds that Hope has failed to establish any of these claims and 
cannot be considered the prevailing party in the aspects of this dispute that involved the 
Agreement. 
82. The Court finds that Robert is the prevailing party and in accordance with 
paragraph Z of the Agreement, the Court must award Robert his fees incurred in 
connection with the dispute over the application of the Agreement. 
83. The Court finds that Robert has established reasonable and necessary fees 
and charges in the amount of $167,884.75 through the end of trial that were related to 
enforcing the terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by the Agreement. 
84. The Court finds that Robert is entitled to recover these fees from Hope by 
deducting $5,000.00 from each month's alimony payment and that the award of fees shall 
bear interest at the rate of 6.99% per annum from October 1, 2007 until paid in full. 
85. The Court recognizes that allowing Robert to deduct $5,000 per month from 
awarded alimony of $15,000 per month will mean that Hope will not receive enough 
money to maintain her at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage. Hope 
will naturally have to curtail her living standard but will still be able to maintain a 
comfortable lifestyle. This temporary curtailment is the natural consequence of her 
decision to pursue a claim for community property when the clear intention of the 
Agreement she signed before marrying was to sharply limit the creation of community 
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property. That same Agreement requires that the prevailing party in a dispute over the 
effect of the agieement recovers attorney fees. To increase alimony so Hope can pay 
those fees would make that portion of the Agreement meaningless. 
Based on the preceding findings, the Court enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over the parties to this action, 
their minor child, and the subject matter of the action. 
2. Robert and Hope should be awarded a Decree of Divorce terminating their 
marriage which should become final upon entry. 
3. The Order based on the stipulation entered into by the parties relating to 
child support, parent time, and custody of Callie Jo, attached hereto as Exhibit "A," is in 
the best interest of the child and shall be accepted and ratified by the Court and 
incorporated into the Decree of Divorce. 
4. The prenuptial Agreement entered into by the parties is valid, binding, and 
enforceable as written. 
5. There was no breach of the prenuptial Agreement that would require the 
Court to invalidate the Agreement. 
6. Hope is not a partner in the Resort, Levinius, LLC, Flat Iron Mesa, or any 
other entity in which Robert has any interest. 
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7. The prenuptial Agreement is unambiguous and can be interpreted and 
applied as a matter of law. 
8. The only salary or earnings that Robert has received since the date of the 
parties' marriage was received during the first four months of marriage and was 
immediately consumed by community living expenses, thus resulting in no community 
property pursuant to the prenuptial Agreement. 
9. Robert has not received any other earnings or salary as contemplated by the 
prenuptial Agreement from any venture or entity, including but not limited to, the Resort 
or Flat Iron Mesa that would result in the creation of community property. 
10. There is no community property that would create a marital estate subject to 
division between Robert and Hope under their premarital agreement. 
11. Hope should be awarded alimony as follows: 
a. If Hope does not remarry or cohabit, she should receive monthly 
alimony payments of $15,000.00 for fourteen (14) years and three (3) 
months commencing on October 1, 2007. 
b. If Hope remarries or cohabits within five years of October 1, 2007, 
she should receive an alimony award of $15,000 per month until 
October 1, 2012 after which she should receive a reduced monthly 
alimony award in the amount of $7,500.00 regardless of whether she 
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is still remarried or cohabitation until October 1, 2017 after which 
date alimony will terminate. 
c. If Hope remarries or cohabits after October 1, 2012, her alimony 
award should be immediately reduced to $7,500.00 per month until 
October 1, 2017 after which her alimony will terminate regardless of 
whether she is still remarried or cohabitation. 
d. If Hope remarries or cohabits after October 1, 2017, but before the 
passage of fourteen (14) years and three (3) months, alimony shall 
immediately cease. 
12. The alimony payments herein above awarded should be considered to be 
governed by § 71 of the Internal Revenue Code and be tax deductible to Robert and 
taxable income to Hope pursuant to §215 of the Internal Revenue Code. 
13. Hope shall pay, at a minimum, $30,000.00 of her legal fees by paying all of 
her fees and expenses incurred since June 30, 2007 and if these fees are less than 
$30,000.00, she should pay Robert a refund of the difference. 
14. Robert is not required to pay any further litigation expenses on behalf of 
Hope, including but not limited to, attorney fees, costs, and witness fees. 
15* Robert is the prevailing party in this action and pursuant to paragraph Z of 
the prenuptial Agreement, Robert is entitled to recover the $167,884.75 in legal fees that 
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he incurred in enforcing the terms, conditions, and obligations imposed by the prenuptial 
Agreement. This balance should accrue interest at the rate of 6.99% per annum from 
October 1, 2007 until paid in full. 
16. Robert is entitled to recover these fees from Hope by deducting $5,000.00 
per month from her alimony payment until the $167,884.75 together with interest is paid 
in full. An amortization table reflecting the payment schedule is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B. 
DATED this day of , 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
Seventh District Court Judge 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 10-17-07 wpd 
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foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served by U.S. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
SEVENTH *>'**?": ?£&• * ^ 
Grand County 
RLED CCT ' . 37 
THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KEITH LEVIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
HOPE M. CARLTON-LEVIN 
Defendants, 
RULING 
Case No. 054700107 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
The court has reviewed the findings, conclusions and decree 
submitted by petitioner and the objection filed by respondent. 
Because the court has determined that some language should be 
changed, it will not sign the submitted findings, conclusions and 
decree. 
The court directs that counsel for petitioner make the 
following changes: 
1. Paragraph 15 of the findings should be amended by adding 
"including some borrowed money" between "property" and "in" in 
the first sentence. "Name" in the second sentence should be 
changed to "named." 
2. Paragraph 29.b. of the findings should be changed by 
deleting the last sentence and adding "Obviously, now that Hope 
knows the insurance has been cancelled, it is her responsibility 
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to secure replacement coverage if desired. Robert's only duty 
will be to cooperate with that process." 
3. Paragraph 29.c. of the findings should be changed to add 
"the financial statements of his companies and the payment or 
non-payment of salary" between "activities" and "to" in the first 
sentence. 
4. Paragraph 40 of the findings should be changed to delete 
"any business venture" from the last sentence and replace it with 
"Flat Iron Mesa and the Resort." 
5. Paragraph 52 of the findings should be changed by 
deleting the last sentence. 
6. Paragraph 53 should be deleted in its entirety. 
7. A paragraph should be added after current paragraph 66, 
which reads "The court's best estimate of "barn expenses" is $600 
per month." 
8. The "2" in paragraph 79 should be changed to "Z." 
9. Paragraph 15 of the decree should be changed by adding, 
"only" between "is" and "entitled." and adding these sentences, 
"Notwithstanding this deduction, the court clarifies that the 
amount of alimony Hope is to be paid is $15,000 per month, from 
which a deduction to pay this judgment is to be made. Hope's 
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alimony is not reduced; a deduction is being made to pay the 
judgment." 
The other objections made by respondent are noted and 
overruled. Respondent correctly notes that some of the findings 
go beyond what was expressly stated in the Memorandum Decision. 
Where those proposed findings reflect findings the court 
implicitly made or would have made if asked to do so, they are 
now adopted by the court by overruling the objection. Where the 
court has directed that words be deleted, no finding is made and 
no negative implication of a contrary finding should be inferred. 
The court recognizes that allowing Robert to deduct $5,000 
per month from awarded alimony of $15,000 per month will mean 
that Hope will not receive enough money to maintain her at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage. She will 
naturally have to curtail her living standard, but will still be 
able to maintain a comfortable lifestyle. This temporary 
curtailment is the natural consequence of her decision co pursue 
a claim for community property when the clear intention of the 
agreement she signed before marrying was to sharply limit the 
creation of community property. That same agreement requires 
that the prevailing party in a dispute over the effect of the 
agreement recovers attorney fees. To increase alimony so Hope 
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can pay those fees would make that portion of the agreement 
meaningless. 
Dated this day of October, 2007. 
iy'le R. Anderson, District Judge 
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EXHIBIT 3 
THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT KEITH LEVIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
HOPE M. CARLTON LEVIN 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 054700107 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
Robert Keith Levin ("Robert") and Hope Marie Carlton-Levin 
("Hope") were married on September 14, 1991. Both have now asked 
the court to end their marriage on the ground that they have 
irreconcilable differences. The court finds that they do have 
irreconcilable differences, and that each is entitled to a 
divorce from the other. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Robert had assets worth over $10 million when Robert and 
Hope married. He accumulated his wealth primarily in the women's 
apparel industry. When the couple married, he was just 
completing his obligation to work for Kellwood, the company co 
which he had sold his women's apparel business. For three or 
four months after the wedding, he continued to receive salary 
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from Kellwood. He also received residual payments based on the 
success of the business he had sold to Kellwood. 
At the time they married, Hope was 25 years old. She had 
enjoyed some success in the film, television and advertising 
industry as a model and actress, but had certainly not become a 
star. She had acted in some obscure films, and her television 
appearances were sporadic. Even though her public debut was in 
1985, the highest amount she earned before she married Robert was 
$44,000 in 1989. 
Before marrying, Robert and Hope signed a Prenuptial 
Agreement (the "Agreement"). The court determined on summary 
judgment that the Agreement was valid at its inception. The 
evidence presented at trial reinforces the court's summary 
determination. Hope and Robert were both represented by capable 
counsel and there were negotiations back and forth that resulted 
in an agreement that reflected input from both Hope and Robert. 
Shortly after they married, Robert and Hope moved to Park 
City, Utah. They lived a luxurious leisure lifestyle in Park 
City, which included frequent trips to Lake Powell to relax on 
their houseboat. Living in Utah may have impeded development of 
Hope's career, but she was free to travel to other areas to take 
advantage of career opportunities. Hope and Robert had money and 
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time to enjoy a wide variety of travel and entertainment 
opportunities. 
In 1994, Robert purchased ranch property adjacent to the 
Colorado River in Grand County, Utah. Robert and Hope moved to 
the ranch and began to develop it with an eye to making it a 
destination resort. The ranch was purchased for $800,000, but 
Robert eventually invested about $11 million in the ranch, 
including some borrowed money. At some point, the ranch became 
known as Sorrel River Ranch Resort (the "Resort"). The Resort 
did not have taxable earnings until 2 005, when it reported 
taxable income of about $200,000 on revenues of about $4.4 
million. 
The process of getting from a traditional ranch to a 
destination resort was difficult. Both Robert and Hope worked to 
effect the transformation. Their daughter, Calli Jo, was born in 
1997. While Robert and Hope worked to build the Resort and make 
it a success, they also continued to enjoy numerous amenities at 
the Resort. Hope was able to pursue her love of horses because 
the Resort had a barn and included horseback riding as a service 
available to guests. As a spa, pool, and dining room were 
developed at the Resort, Hope was able to take advantage of those 
amenities. Thus, even though Hope worked in the business, she 
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also continued to enjoy an amenities lifestyle. Although Hope's 
expenditures were the source of regular arguments between Hope 
and Robert, the court believes she was generally able to purchase 
anything she desired to purchase. 
Beginning in 2003, Robert became an investor in a limited 
liability company that developed lots on Flat Iron Mesa in San 
Juan County, Utah. Robert was willing to invest in the company 
and keep the financial records, but was adamant that he was so 
consumed with the development of the Resort that he could devote 
virtually no time to the development on Flat Iron Mesa. Another 
member of that company, John Ogden, did virtually all of the 
work. Robert received 60% of the profits of that company. By 
the time all of the lots had been sold in 2007, Robert had 
received profits of about $1.5 million. 
Hope and Robert both agree that one of the benefits of 
living and working at the Resort is that many of the expenses of 
living were covered by the business, in exchange for having Hope 
and Robert readily accessible to work in the business. 
Robert elected to run the Resort through a limited liability 
company called Levinius, L.L.C. ("Levinius"). It appears that 
the land on which the Resort is located is owned by other limited 
liability companies which are in turn owned by Levinius. In 
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short, Robert controls the Resort through his control of 
Levinius. There are no written agreements granting Hope an 
ownership interest in the Resort, Levinius, or any of the 
subsidiary companies. 
Levinius did not show taxable income until 2005. Even after 
the application of 2 005 income, Levinius had accumulated taxable 
losses of about $2 million at the end of 2005. By that time, 
Levinius also had about $3.6 million of accumulated depreciation. 
THE ISSUES 
Commendably, Robert and Hope have resolved all of the issues 
relating to their child, Calli Jo, who is now ten years old. The 
court hereby approves their stipulation regarding custody, parent 
time, and child support. 
The two issues litigated at trial were 1) the existence and 
amount of community property, and 2) the appropriate amount and 
duration of alimony. The court will first address community 
property. 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
Robert and Hope were married in California, but have lived 
in Utah for over ten years. Were it not for the Agreement this 
court would probably apply Utah law in dividing their property, 
which affords trial courts great latitude in considering the 
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contributions of both parties to the accumulation of wealth 
during the marriage. The Agreement is lengthy and detailed. The 
Agreement provides that it is governed by California law. 
A. Alleged Breach 
Hope maintains that the Agreement is not effective if either 
party breaches any of its obligations thereunder. She cites the 
following language from paragraph 1 of the Agreement: 
"The effectiveness of this Agreement is expressly 
conditioned upon. . . each party's . . . performance 
of the terms and conditions contained herein." 
Hope maintains that Robert failed to perform the terms and 
conditions of the Agreement by 1) failing to pay income taxes, 
(2) failing to maintain insurance on Robert's life for Hope's 
benefit, 3) failing to comply with the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing implicit in every contract, and 4) failing to 
fulfill his fiduciary duty to Hope. She maintains that those 
breaches invalidate the Agreement. The court examines each 
argument in turn. 
A. 1. Taxes 
Paragraph 0. of the Agreement imposes on Robert the 
obligation to report his income for the purposes of federal or 
state income tax returns. Hope maintains that the aggressive 
deductions claimed on their past tax returns raise a question 
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whether Robert has satisfied this obligation. However, also in 
paragraph 0., Robert promises to indemnify Hope against any 
claims, assessment, deficiencies, interest, penalties, fees and 
costs attributable to his income arising out of any filed tax 
return. This specific remedy is clearly the remedy Hope and 
Robert agreed upon for possible failure to properly report 
income, not the invalidation of the Agreement. 
A. 2 . Insurance 
Paragraph P. of the Agreement imposes on Robert the 
obligation to maintain $250,000 of life insurance on his life 
naming Hope as beneficiary as long as they are married and living 
together. This obligation he has satisfied. However, 
subparagraph P.4. also requires Robert to notify Hope before 
cancelling this insurance and to require his insurance company to 
notify her ais well. Robert admits he has cancelled that policy 
since separaition without giving and requiring that notice. Hope 
claims this invalidates the Agreement. However, subparagraph 
P.4. provides a specific remedy for this failure - Robert's 
estate essentially becomes an insurer of his life and must pay 
$250,000 to Hope if he dies without insurance in force. As with 
the taxes, the specific remedy trumps the general remedy of 
invalidating the Agreement. 
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A. 3. Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Hope argues that Robert violated his duty of good faith and 
fair dealing by manipulating his activities, the financial 
statements of his companies, and his receipt of salary from his 
businesses to prevent the accumulation of community property. 
Hope's claim that Robert must work in ways that create community 
property is undermined by subparagraph F.2. of the Agreement, 
which allows Robert to "pursue any vocation, occupation or 
profession'' . Hope has also failed to persuade the court that 
Robert manipulated any opportunity to receive salary. It was 
reasonable to work at the Resort without compensation as long as 
the Resort was not profitable. Even after profitability, it is 
appropriate to wait until a return on investment is made before 
paying a salary to Robert. Finally, even though neither Robert 
nor Hope received a salary from the Resort, each of them received 
extensive and substantial benefits from living at the Resort. 
A. 4. Fiduciary Duty 
Hope claims that Robert violated his fiduciary duty to her. 
However, the Agreement makes clear that Robert has a fiduciary 
duty only when community property exists. If no community 
property exists, he has no duty. 
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With all of these claims of a failure to perform, the court 
would in any event be required to apply the rule that a contract 
is not invalidated except for a substantial breach. The court 
rejects Hope's claims that the Agreement is invalid because 
Robert did not perform his obligations thereunder. 
Partnership 
Although Hope has presented no agreement signed by Robert 
which makes her a partner in any of his business enterprises, she 
maintains that there is substantial evidence that he did in fact 
make her a partner. Her evidence includes her own testimony that 
Robert talked to her on at least three occasions to tell her how 
she must conduct herself as an "owner'7 . Robert denies these 
conversations. He maintains that he and Hope frequently argued 
about her lack of ownership. Hope also presented a clip of a 
television program featuring the Resort which described her as a 
"co-owner". Several magazine articles featuring the Resort 
referred to Hope as an "owner". Finally, Hope presented the 
testimony of Stuart Berman, the former lawyer of Robert in 
California, who briefly shared an ownership interest in the 
Resort with Robert in 1999. Berman testified that all 
discussions between him and Robert included the implicit 
assumption that Hope was a "co-owner" of Robert's interest. 
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The court is aware of no authority that creates a ownership 
interest simply because third parties believe such ownership 
exists. The belief of those third parties could, under some 
circumstances be sufficient evidence of ownership, but the 
ownership would have to be created by agreement of the parties. 
Subparagraph W. 2 of the Agreement expressly provides that the 
use of "such expressions as 'our property', 'our house' or 'our 
bank account'" does not alter the Agreement. The Agreement 
provides that community property comes into existence only as the 
Agreement provides. Paragraph D. 3. of the Agreement clearly 
provides that separate property becomes community property only 
if a document of title so indicates and the relinquishing party 
clearly acknowledges the relinquishment of a one-half interest in 
the property. 
Stuart Berman's testimony is undermined by his obvious 
anger at Robert, which persists even though he made $475,000 on 
an investment of $1,721,000 in just eight months. His testimony 
is also seriously undermined by the actual language of the 
agreements between Berman and Robert. Hope signed only one of 
those agreements, and only in the capacity of a consenting 
spouse, which a careful lawyer from California would require when 
dealing with a married man who insists his wife actually has no 
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ownership interests. It is obvious that Berman knew Hope was not 
a co-owner. 
Hope claims that her putative ownership interest in Levinius 
is unaffected by the Agreement's requirement of a writing because 
she asserts it against Levinius, not against Robert. Levinius, 
of course, is not a party to this action. Robert is, and he is 
entitled to the protection of the Agreement. Hope's claim that 
she became a partner by virtue of verbal agreements is rejected 
because 1) the Agreement requires a written agreement to create a 
partnership, and 2) her claims that a verbal agreement was made 
are not credible. 
The Meaning of "Earnings" 
The court now turns to what it considers Hope's strongest 
claim; that subparagraph F.3. of the Agreement provides that the 
profits or cash flow from Flat Iron Mesa and/or the Resort, are 
community property. 
The Agreement reverses the presumption under California law 
that any income resulting from the efforts of a husband or wife 
during marriage, and any property acquired with that income, is 
community property. Instead, all income, and all property 
acquired with that income, is separate property, unless the 
Agreement otherwise provides. Subparagraph D.l. of the Agreement 
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provides that earnings are governed by paragraph F. Subparagraph 
F.1. of the Agreement provides that earnings from personal 
services, skills, efforts, talents or work are separate property, 
except as the Agreement specifically provides. Subparagraph F.2. 
of the Agreement creates a community property right in the 
"earnings" or "base salary" derived from actual effort or 
employment of Robert. "Earnings" or "base salary" are defined as 
compensation for labor or services performed by Robert, but not 
including any benefits associated with the "earnings" or "base 
salary". The only earnings or base salary derived from actual 
efforts of Robert were paid during the four months following the 
marriage, were deposited in the joint account and promptly 
consumed on community expenses. 
Subparagraph F.4. defines the Kellwood payments, except 
salary, as separate property. Subparagraph F.5. provides a 
community property right in bonuses received by Robert as an 
employee under limited circumstances. Subparagraph F.6. provides 
an additional community property right in bonuses based on the 
duration of the marriage. Subparagraph F.7. provides a community 
property right in pension payments based on longevity of the 
marriage. Subparagraph F.8. excludes any community property 
participation in stock options or dividends. Subparagraph F.9. 
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provides that earnings or salary from joint business ventures 
between Hope and Robert are community property, but joint 
business ventures are established by written agreement. 
Subparagraph F.10. makes all of Hope's earnings separate. 
Paragraph I. of the Agreement provides that all profits, 
rents, increase, appreciation and income from Robert's separate 
property are also his property. A change in the form of Robert's 
separate property does not change the characterization of that 
property. If Robert sells separate property and purchases other 
property, the new property is also separate property. Paragraph 
J. of the Agreement provides that devoting time, skills or effort 
to separate property does not change it to community property. 
Against this background, the court is asked to interpret 
subparagraph F.3, which reads as follows: 
"In the event ROBBIE enters into any type of 
business venture or ventures from and after the 
date of marriage from which ROBBIE will receive 
earnings or salary therefrom (regardless of whether 
such eairnings or salary have been derived from 
actual effort or services performed by ROBBIE for 
or on behalf of the business venture), such earnings 
or salary, derived from business ventures or ventures, 
shall be community property. For purposes of this 
paragraph F.3., the term "earnings" or "salary" 
derived from said business ventures or ventures 
excludes pension and deferred income contributions, 
stock, stock options, bonuses, benefits and rights, 
and perquisites, which items shall remain ROBBIE'S separate 
property subj ect to Paragraphs F.5, F.6. and F.7. 
It is the parties intention that all property 
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acquired with such "earnings" or "salary" (defined 
under this Paragraph F.3.) shall be community 
property unless the parties agree otherwise in writing." 
Robert maintains that the words "salary" and "earnings" have 
the same meaning in subparagraph F.3. as they had in subparagraph 
F.2. Hope, on the other hand, points out that the language that 
followed "earnings" and "base salary" in F.2 were "derived from 
actual effort or employment of ROBBIE", whereas the words that 
follow "earnings" and "salary" in F.3. are "regardless of whether 
such earnings or salary have been derived from actual effort or 
services performed by ROBBIE". Robert explains this as loosening 
the requirement that Robert actually perform services for his 
business venture to make his earnings or salary community 
property, but maintains that "earnings" still have the customary 
meaning under California law of payment received because of 
services provided, as opposed to investments made. Hope 
maintains that both Flat Iron Mesa and the Resort are business 
ventures entered into by Robert, and that any profits allocated 
to Robert from those ventures are "earnings" that are community 
property under F.3. 
There is no question that, in the absence of the Agreement, 
the profits of Flat Iron Mesa would be Robert's separate property 
because the investment in Flat Iron Mesa was funded by Robert's 
14 
separate property. Hope made an effort to persuade the court 
that Robert was actively involved in the management of Flat Iron 
Mesa. Even if the court were convinced of that, it was Robert's 
money, not his business efforts, that made the Flat Iron Mesa 
profits possible. The Resort is a somewhat different situation; 
Robert's investment in the Resort was critical to its success, 
but his management was also a factor. 
Reading the Agreement as a whole, particularly in view of 
the portions of the Agreement described above, the court is 
convinced that "earnings" in subparagraph F.3. means payments 
based at least in theory on services, such as actual salary, 
guaranteed payments to a member in a limited liability company, 
or draws to a partner in an operating business partnership. It 
does not mean any kind of profits from a business venture. 
Were the court to consider parol evidence, its finding about 
the meaning of "earnings" would be the same. Robert testified 
that he always intended that Hope would participate primarily in 
his base salary from employment and then in bonuses and pension 
payments only under limited circumsyances. He remembers 
specifically discussing F.3. and understanding it to mean that 
Hope would participate only in his wages, salary or similar 
payments from any new businesses he may start. Hope's 
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recollection of specific provisions of the Agreement is virtually 
non existent. Her description of what she understood the 
Agreement to mean was general and did not appear to be based on 
actual memory of the language of the Agreement or advice of her 
attorney concerning its meaning. Moreover, Robert's 
interpretation is more consistent with the overall expressed 
purpose of the Agreement. It is hard to believe that Robert went 
to the trouble of obtaining a prenuptial agreement so he could 
ensure that Hope would claim one-half of profits from any 
business ventures in which he would become involved. 
Because the parties presented evidence of what profits Flat 
Iron Mesa and the Resort have realized, and because the court 
expects that an appeal of this decision is likely, the court will 
also analyze what Hope should receive if her interpretation of 
F.3. is ultimately accepted. 
A. Flat Iron Mesa 
Under California law community property ceases to accumulate 
when the parties separate. This also appears to be the intent of 
the Agreement. See subparagraph F.l. of the Agreement. Hope and 
Robert had certainly separated by the end of 2005, so Hope would 
be entitled at most, to any profits of Flat Iron Mesa earned by 
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the end of 2005. Robert's share of profits from Flat Iron Mesa 
was $476,609 in 2003, $294,465 in 2004, and $285,006 in 2005. 
The court is not persuaded that Flat Iron Mesa was a 
business venture within the meaning of F.3. It was an 
investment. Robert contributed nothing of significance to Flat 
Iron Mesa other than his money. Any profits he received were 
clearly unearned income. 
B. The Resort 
If F.3. makes the profits of the Resort community property, 
the court must decide whether the Resort had any profits. From 
its inception through the end of 2 005, the Resort had an 
accumulated taxable loss of $2 million. It also had accumulated 
depreciation of $3.6 million. Since depreciation does not 
represent an expenditure of cash, Hope argues that accumulated 
depreciation must be added to taxable income to calculate 
operating cash flow, which is what she contends F.3. means by 
"earnings." 
The court recognizes that the reason the Resort has $3.6 
million of accumulated depreciation is that Robert has invested 
$11 million of his separate property and borrowed money in the 
Resort. The Resort was certainly not a cash cow through 2005. 
Moreover, the court agrees with Robert's expert that, even if 
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depreciation does not represent an expenditure of cash, it does 
represent an allowance for replacing wasting assets which wear 
out and must eventually be replaced. While it may be that the 
depreciation allowance under U.S. tax laws is more generous than 
would actually be required for replacing wasting assets, the 
court does not agree that no allowance is required. In the 
absence of better information about an appropriate allowance, the 
court falls back on that provided under U.S. tax law. 
In all of this analysis, it is worth noting that Robert has 
made enormous cash investments in the Resort, in addition to 
devoting himself to making the Resort profitable. Hope also 
devoted herself to making the Resort profitable, but she made no 
cash investment in the Resort. Both Hope and Robert, though they 
worked hard, enjoyed the amenities of the Resort and lived a 
luxurious lifestyle. Under Utah law, Hope is entitled to 
sufficient alimony to preserve that lifestyle. Under Utah law, 
the court would properly award Hope only a small percentage, if 
any, of the Resort. Under California law, the Resort would 
likely remain separate property of Robert, subject to possible 
compensation of Hope for her contribution to its success. Under 
the Agreement, interpreting F.3. as Hope desires, Hope would be 
entitled only to one-half of accumulated profits received by 
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Robert, less one half of those profits applied to community 
expenses. The only distributions to Robert from the Resort were 
in 2003 and 2005, and totaled about $280,000. Thus, the most 
community property Hope would be entitled to is $140,000, reduced 
by community expenses over the course of the marriage. She has 
already received a voluntary property settlement from Robert of 
over $100,000. 
For the reasons set forth above the court determines that 
there is no community property to divide. 
Alimony 
Robert maintains that Hope is entitled to no more than 
$10,000 per month alimony. Hope seeks $30,000 per month. Since 
Robert has stipulated that he can afford any reasonable alimony 
award, the only question is what amount of alimony will maintain 
Hope in the lifestyle to which she was accustomed during the 
marriage. 
The parties spent about $9,000 per month on Hope's expenses 
before separation. After separation, Hope spent about $10,500 per 
month. Hope's expert witness presented a proposed budget that 
amounted, in many ways, to combining pre-separation and post-
separation expenses. His argument was that the pre-separation 
expenses were basically for luxuries and that Hope's necessities 
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were provided as an incident to her residence at the Resort. 
After separation, Hope's witness testified, Hope eliminated most 
luxuries and spent her temporary alimony on necessities. Thus, 
to restore her marital standard of living, Hope would need 
$19,707 per month. Her expert added to this figure about $5,000 
per month for income taxes, and $6,800 per month to purchase an 
additional residence for about $1 million. Thus, Hope demands 
alimony of $30,000 per month. 
The court does not fully agree with the budget Robert 
proposes for Hope. For example, Robert proposes to reduce Hope's 
allowance for medical treatments not covered by insurance - a 
category that historically included laser treatment and plastic 
surgery - to an amount that would cover only deductibles and co-
payments for medically necessary procedures. Regardless of how 
Robert feels or felt about the necessity of plastic surgery, the 
evidence at trial clearly established that maintaining her 
appearance with surgical and similar procedures was a routine 
part of life for Hope. 
Robert also argues that Hope should be expected to work 
outside the home. However, the evidence was clear that Hope 
worked only at the Resort. Even there, it was necessary to hire 
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housekeepers and nannies to take care of the residence and Calli 
Jo when Hope worked at the Resort. 
On the other hand, the court does not agree with Hope that 
she must have a housekeeper/nanny to match her marital standard 
of living. Since she no longer has duties at the Resort, she 
should be able to maintain the property where she now lives 
without the need to hire any employees. This will not cause her 
to work any harder than she did during the marriage. 
The most difficult challenge for the court is to approximate 
the cost of elements of Hope's marital life that were not purely 
economic. How can a court make available all of the amenities 
provided at the Resort? How is the court to value the apparent 
perquisite Hope enjoyed of being able to buy almost anything she 
wanted and go anywhere she wanted? Once Hope separated from 
Robert, she no longer had any access to his substantial monetary 
reserves. This is something the court cannot replace with 
alimony. However, it is possible, by looking at historic 
expenditures, to approximate what monthly payment will enable 
Hope to enjoy the standard of living she enjoyed during the 
marriage. 
The court starts with the budget proposed by Hope's expert, 
Richard Hoffman ("Hoffman"). The court disagrees with Hoffman 
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that the $5,000 of "mad money" Robert gave Hope each of the last 
few months before separation represents any effort to match 
historic expenditures. Hoffman substituted the $5,000 for $1800 
of documented pre-separation monthly expenditures. The court 
accordingly reduces Hoffman's budget by $3,200. The court is 
also unpersuaded that Hope needs a second marital residence worth 
$1 million to match her marital lifestyle. As best this court 
can determine, her present residence is similar in appearance and 
quality to the place she lived at the Resort. 
Robert also challenges Hope's proposed "barn expenses" of 
$2,100 per month. Hope has taken her horses to her new home, 
where she has a barn to house them. Based on actual expenditures 
for horses at the Resort, sometimes including these same horses, 
Robert maintains that $400 per month is sufficient. The court 
agrees that Hope has overstated these projected expenses, but 
also agrees that there were economies of scale at the Resort that 
Hope may not now enjoy. The court's best estimate of "barn 
expenses" is $600 per month. 
Hope includes $550 per month in her budget for private 
school tuition for Calli Jo. Whether Calli Jo will need or want 
to attend private school is something no one presently knows. 
Moreover, her tuition would not properly be treated as alimony, 
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but rather as child support. The court accordingly eliminates 
this from Hope's proposed budget. 
Finally, the court eliminates the budget allocated for 
"savings" of $1,150 per month. As far as this court can 
determine, the purpose of alimony is to permit the maintenance of 
a marital standard of living for a specified period after the end 
of the marriage, not to allow the setting aside of a nest egg to 
maintain the marriage partner thereafter. Nothing in the 
evidence suggests that Robert regularly set aside anything like 
$1,150 per month for Hope's retirement during the marriage. 
With these adjustments the court finds that Hope will 
require $12,000 per month after taxes to maintain her marital 
standard of living. The tax burden for alimony at this level has 
not been calculated by either expert. Robert's expert estimated 
that the combined federal and state tax burden on $10,000 of 
monthly alimony was 19.1%. Hope's expert estimated that the 
combined federal and state burden on $24,500 of month alimony was 
about 20%. Monthly alimony before taxes of $15,000 should yield 
$12,000 per month after taxes. The court awards Hope alimony of 
$15,000 per month. 
Permanency of Alimony 
Because Hope and Robert were married fourteen years and 
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three months before separation, the maximum duration of alimony 
is presumptively fourteen years and three months. Alimony 
usually terminates on remarriage or cohabitation. Hope argues 
that special circumstances - her loss of a potentially rewarding 
career as a model and actress - warrant making this alimony non-
terminable. It is hard to imagine something more speculative 
than the future film or modeling career of someone who has not 
achieved "star" or "super model" status. However, the Agreement 
does authorize this court to consider Hope's career as a factor 
in any aspect of alimony. 
In order to permit Hope to make a gradual adjustment to a 
different lifestyle if she should decide to remarry, as well as a 
cushion towards establishing a new career, the decree will 
provide that alimony will last for at least five years even if 
Hope remarries or cohabits, and that it shall continue 
thereafter, even with remarriage or cohabitation, at a reduced 
level of $7,500 per month, for five more years. In other words, 
if Hope remarries or cohabits before October 1, 2012, alimony 
will not be reduced or eliminated until October 1, 2012, when it 
will be reduced to $7,500 per month. If she remarries after 
October 1, 2012, but before October 1, 2017, it will be reduced 
to $7,500 until October 1, 2017, when it will be eliminated. 
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Remarriage or cohabitation after October 1, 2017, will cause an 
immediate elimination of alimony. 
Child Support 
Hope and Robert have agreed on child support of $1,000 per 
month. If the parties determine that Calli Jo should attend 
private school, Robert shall pay reasonable tuition. 
Attorney Fees 
There are two attorney fee issues in this case; first, 
whether Hope should be required to reimburse Robert for all or 
part of the fees he advanced for her and second, whether either 
party has prevailed in a dispute arising out of the terms, 
conditions and obligations imposed by the Agreement, and is 
therefore entitled to recover attorney fees under paragraph Z. of 
the Agreement. 
With respect to the first issue, the court promised, when it 
originally required Robert to pay Hope's attorney fees, that it 
may require her to reimburse him. It was important to ensure 
that Hope had an opportunity to present her best case to the 
court and that she not be overwhelmed by Robert's resources. 
Hope incurred litigation expenses of $120,000 through June 30, 
2007. Robert had paid $80,000 of those fees and disputed 
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$40,000. At the close of trial, the court instructed Robert to 
pay those fees. Through August 28, 2007, Robert had incurred 
litigation expenses of $124,000 just in securing a determination 
of the validity and enforcement of the Agreement. The court is 
unable to say that Hope's fees are unreasonable in amount when 
they are less than Robert's fees. Also, even though the court 
ultimately found for Robert on the property issues, the court 
cannot find that Hope's position was so untenable that she should 
be required to cover her own fees. 
The theory on which Utah law permits a court to require one 
party to a divorce to advance the fees of the other is to permit 
each side an equal opportunity to present its case. Hope did not 
have the resources to match Robert's effort without assistance. 
However, she did have approximately $35,000 in her securities 
account from gifts Robert made during the course of the marriage. 
The court should have required her to use that account at least 
in substantial part. The court will require that Hope pay 
$30,000 of her own fees, plus whatever amount her fees since June 
30, 2007, exceed $3 0,000. In other words, Robert shall not be 
required to pay any litigation expense incurred by Hope after 
June 30, 2007, and, if those expenses are less than $30,000, the 
difference shall be refunded to Robert. 
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With respect to paragraph Z. of the Agreement, the court 
finds that Robert- is the prevailing^ party in the dispute "arising 
out of the terms, conditions and obligations imposed by" the 
Agreement. Hope's claims for community property were based first 
on her effort to invalidate the Agreement, second on her claim 
that she was a co-owner of the Resort, and third, that she was 
entitled to one-half of Robert's distributions from Flat Iron 
Mesa and one-half of the "operating cash flow' of the Resort. 
Given the disposition of all those claims, this court cannot 
consider Hope the prevailing party in the aspects of this dispute 
that involved the Agreement. Robert is the prevailing party. 
In accordance with paragraph Z. of the Agreement, the court 
must award Robert his fees in connection with the dispute over 
the application of the Agreement. He claims $167,884.75 through 
the end of trial. Those services were necessary and the charges 
therefor were reasonable. The court awards Robert his fees of 
$167,884.75. 
Robert may recover his fees only by deducting $5,000 from 
each month's alimony payment. The award of fees shall bear 
interest at 6.99% per annum from October 1, 2 007. 
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Counsel for Robert should submit findings, conclusions and a 
decree pursuant to Rule 7, URCP. 
Dated this day of September, 2007. 
& QwJljU*i}-^, 
Lyle R. Anderson, Dis t r ic j t Judge 
-SfefeftK/QEPUTY CLERK 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 054700107 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Dated this / l day of-. 
Mail DAVID S DOLOWITZ 
Attorney PET 
257 E 200 S STE 700 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail KENNETH A OKAZAKI 
Attorney RES 
170 S MAIN ST STE 1500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
•<J 20 £L2-
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
EXHIBIT 4 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT 
THIS PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is made and 
entered into th is /<- day of ( ^ A ^ , 1991, in the 
City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, 
by and between HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO (hereinafter referred to as 
"HOPE") and ROBERT LEVIN (hereinafter referred to as "ROBBIE"), 
with reference to the following facts: 
1. This Agreement is entered into in consideration of 
marriage and the promises contained herein. The effectiveness of 
this Agreement is expressly conditioned upon such marriage 
between the parties actually taking place and each party's 
subsequent performance of the terms and conditions contained 
herein. If, for any reason, the marriage does not take place, 
this Agreement will be of no force or effect. 
2. ROBBIE has been previously married and divorced, 
and has one son, PAUL LEVIN, age 20. HOPE has not been 
previously married and has no children. 
3. The parties hereto desire and do hereby define the 
respective rights of each in the property, income, assets, and 
liabilities that each may have or may thereafter acquire, and the 
parties agree that, except as may expressly be set forth herein, 
all property, real and personal, owned by either of them at the 
time of the contemplated marriage, from whatever source, 
including any growth in the value of said property, whether or 
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not due to the efforts of one or both of the parties during the 
marriage, shall be and remain the separate property of the person 
who initially owned or subsequently acquired the property, and 
neither shall acquire any interest or right to any of the 
property of the other. 
4. ROBBIE has substantially disclosed to HOPE, by the 
attached Exhibit "A11, the nature, extent and value of his 
property interests, including, without limitation, his various 
present business and investment interests and his present and 
potential income from various sources, including without 
limitation, his business and investment interests. The parties 
acknowledge that the total value of ROBBIEfs property interests 
is estimated to be in excess of $10,000,000.00. 
5. HOPE has substantially disclosed to ROBBIE, by the 
attached Exhibit MB", the nature, extent and value of her 
property interests, including, without limitation, her various 
present business and investment interests and her present and 
potential income from various sources, including, without 
limitation, her business and investment interests. The parties 
acknowledge that the total value of HOPE'S property interests is 
estimated to be in excess of $ . 
6. HOPE and ROBBIE acknowledge to each other that 
each does not now have, possess, or claim any rights or interest 
in the present or future income, property, or assets of the 
other, except as hereinafter specifically provided for. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, and of 
the terms, covenants, and conditions herein contained, the 
parties hereto agree to the following: 
A. BINDING AGREEMENT 
HOPEfs and ROBBIEfs rights with respect to the property 
owned by either of them at the time of the contemplated marriage 
or acquired during marriage to each other shall be subject to the 
terms of this Agreement. 
B. DISCLOSURE OF PROPERTY 
1. At the time this Agreement is executed, ROBBIE 
sets forth in Exhibit "A", attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein, substantially all real and personal property 
in which he has an interest and the extent of that interest, and 
any other resources or means of support. 
2. At the time this Agreement is executed, HOPE sets 
forth in Exhibit flBM, attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein, substantially all real and personal property 
in which she has an interest and the extent of that interest, and 
any other resources or means of support. 
3. At the time this Agreement is executed, ROBBIE 
sets forth in Exhibit MCff, attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein, substantially all obligations for which he 
is liable. 
4. At the time this Agreement is executed, HOPE sets 
forth in Exhibit !IDI!, attached hereto and by this reference 
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incorporated herein, substantially all obligations for which she 
is liable. 
5. The foregoing disclosures are for courtesy only 
and not an inducement to enter into this Agreement. ROBBIE and 
HOPE agree that each is willing to enter into this Agreement 
freely and voluntarily regardless of the nature, extent or total 
amount of the present or future assets, liabilities, income or 
expenses of the other, and each party voluntarily and expressly 
waives hereto any right to disclosure of the property and/or 
obligations of the other party beyond the disclosures provided in 
this Agreement. 
C. REPRESENTATION BY INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 
HOPE acknowledges that she has been represented by 
independent counsel, FLYNN, KNERR & OYLER by CONNOLLY OYLER, 
ESQ., and ROBBIE acknowledges that he has been represented by 
independent counsel, SIMKE, CHODOS, SILBERFELD & ANTEAU, INC. by 
RONALD W. ANTEAU, ESQ., in preparation of this Agreement; that 
counsel representing each party is of his or her own choosing; 
and that this Agreement has been read by the parties and that its 
meaning and legal consequence have been explained fully to them 
by their counsel and are understood. 
D. PROPERTIES OF EACH SPOUSE THAT ARE TO REMAIN SEPARATE 
1. ROBBIE and HOPE agree that all property, including 
the property set forth in Exhibit "A11, belonging to ROBBIE at the 
commencement of the marriage shall remain his separate property. 
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ROBBIE shall have sole management and control over the property, 
and the property shall be subject to his disposition as his 
separate property in the same manner as if no marriage had been 
entered into. All earnings of ROBBIE during the marriage shall 
be characterized as defined hereinbelow and as more fully set 
forth in Paragraph F. below. 
2. HOPE and ROBBIE agree that all property, including 
the property set forth in Exhibit ,!B!f, belonging to HOPE at the 
commencement of the marriage shall remain her separate property. 
HOPE shall have sole management and control over the property, 
and the property shall be subject to her disposition as her 
separate property in the same manner as if no marriage had been 
entered into. All earnings of HOPE during the marriage shall be 
characterized as defined hereinbelow and as more fully set forth 
in Paragraph F. below. 
3. Without this Agreement, the parties acknowledge 
that property acquired during marriage in California could be 
categorized as community property. Community property is defined 
by Civil Code, §687, which states, "Community property is 
property sicquired by husband and wife, or either, during 
marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either," 
and by Section 5110, which states, "except as provided in 
Sections 5107, 5108, and 5126, all real property situated in this 
state and all personal property wherever situated acquired during 
the marriage by a married person while domiciled in this state 
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and property held in trust pursuant to Section 5110.150, is 
community property...". The parties acknowledge and agree that 
they understand and are aware of the fact that under community 
property law, each would be entitled to a one-half (1/2) interest 
in the property and income of the other when same is acquired 
under the definition of community property. ROBBIE and HOPE 
understand and agree that, by this Agreement, there shall be no 
community property and that all assets, no matter when acquired, 
shall be the sole and separate property of the party so acquiring 
it unless specifically designated otherwise in this Agreement 
and/or on a document of title contrary to the terms of this 
Agreement, and each party acknowledges that he or she is 
relinquishing a one-half (1/2) interest in property or income 
acquired by the other party as a direct result. Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary stated above or below in this Agreement, 
the parties desire to and do retain the right to purchase and 
take title to property (real and personal) as joint tenants or 
tenants-in-common or community property if so designated on a 
document of title. 
Each party waives any right of management and 
control over the separate property of the other party and 
acknowledges that there is no fiduciary duty with respect to each 
spouse's management and control over the separate property in 
relation to the other spouse. The parties further acknowledge 
that, without this Agreement, there could be rights of joint 
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management and control of the community personal property, if 
any, as well as a fiduciary duty that each spouse act in good 
faith with respect to the other spouse in the management and 
control of the community property. Each party acknowledges that 
he or she understands that, except for the community property or 
joint property" rights created or reserved under this Agreement, 
which rights and claims remain governed by Civil Code, §5125, et 
sea., each waives all rights pertaining to joint management and 
control of the community property, if any, as well as the duty to 
act in good faith with respect to same, and all rights and claims 
against the other for breach of fiduciary duty and/or for an 
accounting of the property and obligations, pursuant to Civil 
Code, §5125, et seg. 
f. MUTUAL WAIVER OF MARVIN V, MARVIN CLAIMS 
1. HOPE might be entitled to receive compensation 
based upon reasonable value of services rendered by her to ROBBIE 
during the non-marital relationship of the parties. HOPE hereby 
agrees that, notwithstanding the expenditures of her time, skill 
and effort during the non-marital relationship for which she 
might be entitled to receive compensation, HOPE waives all rights 
and claims to receive such compensation for services rendered by 
her including any rights which may inure to her after the 
effective date of this Agreement through the date of the parties1 
marriage. HOPE expressly waives any right or claims she may have 
under the case of Marvin v. Marvin. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that ROBBIE might have 
voluntarily provided HOPE with support or maintenance during the 
non-marital relationship of the parties, such conduct shall not 
be construed as an agreement, either express or implied, to 
provide HOPE with support or maintenance. 
2. ROBBIE might be entitled to receive compensation 
based upon reasonable value of services rendered by him to HOPE 
during the non-marital relationship of the parties. ROBBIE 
hereby agrees that, notwithstanding the expenditures of his time, 
skill and effort during the non-marital relationship for which he 
might be entitled to receive compensation, ROBBIE waives all 
rights and claims to receive such compensation for services 
rendered by him including any rights which may inure to him after 
the effective date of this Agreement through the date of the 
parties1 marriage. ROBBIE expressly waives any right or claims 
he may have under the case of Marvin v. Marvin, supra. 
Notwithstanding the fact that HOPE might have 
voluntarily provided ROBBIE with support or maintenance during 
the non-marital relationship of the parties, such conduct shall 
not be construed as an agreement, either express or implied, to 
provide ROBBIE with support or maintenance. 
F. PROPERTIES OF EACH SPOUSE THAT ARE TO BE COMMUNITY 
1. Without this Agreement, the parties acknowledge 
that all earnings or income resulting from the personal services, 
skills, efforts, talent, or work of the parties during the time 
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that they are married and living together could be categorized as 
community property under California law. ROBBIE and HOPE 
understand and agree that, by this Agreement, any earnings or 
income resulting from the personal services, skills, efforts, 
talents, or work of each of the parties during the time they are 
married and living together, and any property acquired therewith, 
shall be and remain the separate property of the party whose 
personal services, skills, efforts, talent, or work result in 
such earnings or income, except as set forth hereinbelow. 
2. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this 
Agreement, ROBBIE and HOPE understand and agree that the 
"earnings" or "base salary", or accumulations from such earnings 
or salary, derived from actual effort or employment of ROBBIE, 
from and after the date of marriage, shall be community property. 
For purposes of this paragraph, the terms "base salary" or 
"earnings" are defined as compensation for labor or services 
performed by ROBBIE, excluding pension and deferred 
contributions, stock, stock options, bonuses, benefits and 
rights, and perquisites, received by ROBBIE from his employment, 
which items shall remain ROBBIE'S separate property. It is the 
parties' intention that all property acquired with such community 
property earnings of ROBBIE shall be community property, unless 
the parties agree otherwise in writing. In this regard, the 
parties specifically acknowledge and agree that ROBBIE is fully 
free during the course of the marriage to pursue any vocation, 
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occupation or profession, and nothing herein shall limit ROBBIE 
in this regard. 
3. In the event ROBBIE enters into any type of 
business venture or ventures from and after the date of marriage 
from which ROBBIE will receive earnings or salary therefrom 
(regardless of whether such earnings or salary have been derived 
from actual effort or services performed by ROBBIE for or on 
behalf of the business venture), such earnings or salary, or 
accumulations from such earnings or salary, derived from said 
business venture or ventures, shall be community property. For 
purposes of this paragraph F.3., the term "earnings11 or "salary" 
derived from said business venture or ventures excludes pension 
and deferred income contributions, stock, stock options, bonuses, 
benefits and rights, and perquisites, which items shall remain 
ROBBIE'S separate property subject to Paragraphs F.5., F.6. and 
F.7. It is the parties1 intention that all property acquired 
with such "earnings" or "salary" (defined under this Paragraph 
F.3.) shall be community property unless the parties agree 
otherwise in writing. 
4. In regard to ROBBIE'S relationship with Kellwood, 
the parties acknowledge that the earn out which ROBBIE is 
receiving from Kellwood, which continues through December 31, 
1993, is, and shall be, ROBBIE'S separate property. Same shall 
not be taken into consideration in any manner regarding ROBBIE'S 
earnings, salary, or accumulations from such earnings or salary. 
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5. The parties wish to create a community property 
participation in ROBBIEfs separate property earnings which are 
related to bonuses which ROBBIE receives from his employment. In 
this regard, the parties are differentiating between four (4) 
different circumstances, those being circumstances wherein (a) 
ROBBIE is employed as an employee in the same industry (i.e., the 
clothing industry); (b) ROBBIE is employed as an employee in a 
business area outside the clothing industry; (c) ROBBIE is 
rendering services to a corporation in which he is a principal 
shareholder (owning ten percent (10%) or more of the stock) and 
is being compensated for said efforts; and, (d) ROBBIE is 
rendering services on behalf of a corporation in which he owns 
less than ten percent (10%) of the stock therein, and he is being 
compensated for said efforts. In each of these instances, the 
parties have entered into an agreement as to the community's 
participation in monies derived by ROBBIE over and above the 
earnings and/or base salary as set forth in Paragraphs F.2. and 
F.3. above. The parties1 agreement in regard to each of these 
alternatives are: 
a. ROBBIE will be entitled to receive, as his 
separate property, any bonus up to five (5) times a multiple of 
his salary, and any amount in excess thereof shall be community 
property. (The separate property aspect of the bonus is subject 
to the community property participation therein as hereinafter 
set forth in Paragraph F.6.) 
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By way of example (for illustration only and 
with no representation that such sums will be earned), if ROBBIE 
has a salary of $300,000.00, and receives a bonus of 
$2,000,000.00., ROBBIE shall be entitled to a separate property 
interest in the bonus of a multiple of five (5) times the salary, 
i.e., $300,000.00 in salary, $1,500,000.00 in bonus, and the 
balance thereof, $500,000.00, shall be community property. 
b. ROBBIE will be entitled to a separate 
property interest in a bonus of a multiple of three (3) times his 
salary, with the balance of the bonus, if any, being community 
property. (The separate property aspect of the bonus is subject 
to the community property participation therein as hereinafter 
set forth in Paragraph F.6.) 
By way of example (for illustration only and 
with no representation that such sums will be earned), if ROBBIE 
has a salary of $300,000.00 and receives a bonus of $2,000,000.00 
ROBBIE will be entitled to a separate property interest in the 
bonus of three (3) times the salary, i.e., $900,000.00, with the 
balance thereof of $1,100,000.00 being community property. (Total 
earnings of $2,300,000.00; Salary: $300,000.00, separate property 
bonus: $900,000.00, community property bonus: $1,100 f 000.00.) 
e. ROBBIE will be entitled to receive, as his 
separate property, any bonus up to five (5) times a multiple of 
his salary, and any amount in excess thereof shall be community 
property. (The separate property aspect of the bonus is subject 
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to the community property participation therein as hereinafter 
set forth in Paragraph F.6.) 
By way of example (for illustration only and 
with no representation that such sums will be earned), if ROBBIE 
has a salary of $3 00,000.00, and receives a bonus of 
$2,000,000.00., ROBBIE shall be entitled to a separate property 
interest in the bonus of a multiple of five (5) times the salary, 
i.e., $300,000.00 in salary, $1,500,000.00 in bonus, and the 
balance thereof, $500,000.00, shall be community property. 
d. ROBBIE will be entitled to a separate 
property interest in a bonus of a multiple of three (3) times his 
salary, with the balance of the bonus, if any, being community 
property. (The separate property aspect of the bonus is subject 
to the community property participation therein as hereinafter 
set forth in Paragraph F.6.) 
By way of example (for illustration only and 
with no representation that such sums will be earned), if ROBBIE 
has a salary of $300,000.00 and receives a bonus of $2,000,000.00 
ROBBIE will be entitled to a separate property interest in the 
bonus of three (3) times the salary, i.e., $900,000.00, with the 
balance tliereof of $1,100, 000. 00 being community property. (Total 
earnings of $2,300,000.00; Salary: $300,000.00, separate property 
bonus: $900,000.00, community property bonus: $1,100,000.00.) 
e. Any bonus received by ROBBIE from Kellwood is 
excluded from the provisions of Paragraphs F.5.a. through F.5.d. 
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(as more specifically set forth in Paragraph F.4. above). 
6. In addition to the participation hereinabove set 
forth, the community shall participate in ROBBIE'S separate 
property bonus at a rate of five percent (5%) per year, 
commencing December 31, 1992, and continuing at a rate of five 
percent (5%) per year for each full year the parties are married 
thereafter, not to exceed the community having a maximum of a 
fifty percent (50%) interest in the separate property bonus, 
(i.e. at the maximum point in time, any interest in the separate 
property bonus would be fifty percent (50%) ROBBIE'S separate 
property and fifty percent (50%) community property, which would 
occur at the earliest for the year December 31, 2001). 
By way of example, at the end of 1992, as in the 
hypothetical set forth in Paragraph F.5.a. above, the community 
would be entitled to receive five percent (5%) of the 
hypothetical separate property bonus of $2,000,000.00 (i.e., 
$100,000.00). 
7. Additionally, as to any pension and/or deferred 
compensation that ROBBIE will be receiving as a result of the 
employment situations hereinabove set forth, the community shall 
be entitled to share in said pension and/or deferred compensation 
at a rate of five percent (5%) per year, commencing December 31, 
1992, and continuing at a rate of five percent (5%) per year for 
each full year the parties are married thereafter, not to exceed 
the community having a maximum of a fifty percent (50%) interest 
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in the separate property pension and/or deferred compensation, 
(i.e. at the maximum point in time, any interest in the separate 
property pension and/or deferred compensation contributions would 
be fifty percent (50%) ROBBIE'S separate property and fifty 
percent (50%) community property, which would occur at the 
earliest for the year December 31, 2001). 
8. At no time will the community have any interest of 
any kind in any stock options and/or dividends that arise as a 
result of any of ROBBIE'S employment, as hereinabove set forth. 
9. In the event the parties enter into any type of 
joint business venture or ventures from and after the date of 
marriage, the earnings or salary, or accumulations from such 
earnings or salary, derived from said joint business venture or 
ventures, shall be community property. For purpose of this 
paragraph, the parties understand and agree that a joint business 
venture will be established where the parties have entered into a 
written agreement to establish same. The parties understand and 
agree that they will share equally all benefits derived from said 
joint business venture or ventures (including earnings, salary, 
accumulations from such earnings or salary, stock, stock options, 
and perquisites), and all liabilities and obligations related 
thereto. 
10. ROBBIE and HOPE understand and agree that except 
as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any earnings, or income 
resulting from the personal services, skills, efforts, talent, or 
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work of HOPE during the time that HOPE and ROBBIE are married and 
living together and any property acquired therewith, shall be and 
remain the separate property of HOPE. 
G. MUTUAL WAIVERS 
1. Except as otherwise provided in Paragraph F. 
hereinabove of this Agreement, all property of any kind or 
nature, including but not limited to the earnings, income and 
other distributions of any kind or nature, resulting from 
personal services, skill, effort, management and work by either 
party after the marriage shall be the separate property of the 
party so acquiring said property and shall be subject in the same 
manner as though the proposed marriage never had been entered 
into. Each party acknowledges that he or she understands that, 
except for this Agreement, all of the earnings, income and other 
distributions resulting from the personal services, skill, 
effort, management and work of the acquiring party after the 
marriage, would be community property but that, by this 
Agreement, only certain earnings, income and other distributions 
are made the separate property of the party acquiring said 
earnings and income. 
2. Except as may otherwise be provided in this 
Agreement, each of the parties hereto shall have an immediate 
right to dispose of, transfer in any manner, or bequeath by Will, 
his or her respective interest in and to (i) any and all property 
belonging to him or her prior to the effective date hereof, (ii) 
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any separcite property hereafter acquired, and (iii) his or her 
respective share of any community and quasi-community property 
hereafter acquired. Without limiting the generality of the 
foregoingr and subject to any contrary provisions of this 
Agreement and/or subject to the execution of a valid Will, 
confirmed by Codicil or republished subsequent to the effective 
date of this Agreement, ROBBIE and HOPE hereby waive, discharge 
and release any and all right, claim or interest, whether actual, 
inchoate, or contingent, in law and equity, that he or she might 
acquire in the separate property or community of the other by 
reason of the proposed marriage, including, without limitation: 
a. The rights or claims of Dower, Curtesy, or 
any statutory or common law substitutes for one party's right to 
an interest in the other party1s property provided by the 
statutes of the State of California or any other state in which 
the parties may die, be domiciled or in which they own real 
property; 
b. The right of election to take against the 
Will of the other; 
c. The right to act as executor and/or 
administrator of the estate of the other, except in the event 
that the deceased dies intestate; 
d. The right to a family allowance; 
e. The right to a probate homestead; 
f. The right to have exempt property set aside; 
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g. The right to a distributive share of the 
estate of the other should he or she die intestate (including 
such property that would otherwise be community property but for 
this Agreement); and, 
h. The right to take the statutory share of an 
omitted spouse. 
H. WILLS 
1. Any pre-existing Will, testament, or trust 
instrument, or any other instrument which disposes of the estate 
of the other in death, shall remain in full force and effect, and 
shall not be revoked in whole or part by the occurrence of the 
marriage. Each party specifically waives the benefit of all 
probate or other similar statutes which might be in existence 
with respect to revocation of Wills on marriage, including 
without limitation, California Probate Code, §6560, and similar 
statutes in other jurisdictions. 
2. Nothing contained herein shall constitute a waiver 
by either party of any bequest or devise that the other party may 
choose to make to him or her by Will or Codicil after the 
execution of this Agreement. However, the parties acknowledge 
that, except as otherwise provided for herein, no promises of any 
kind have been made by either of them about any such bequest or 
devise. 
Additionally, both parties acknowledge that there 
have been no oral representations of any kind as to any right or 
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any interest in the other's estate, now or in the future, whether 
by way of Will, trust, or any other form of bequest, nor has 
there been any oral promise or any other oral representation that 
any such right or interest shall be provided as a part of or in 
consideration of the entering into this Prenuptial Agreement. 
I. PROFITS FROM SEPARATE PROPERTY 
1. The parties agree that all rents, issues, profits, 
increase, appreciation and income from the separate property of 
ROBBIE, whether real or personal, shall remain his separate 
property. The parties agree that a change in the form of 
ROBBIE'S separate property shall not constitute a change of 
characterization, and the separate property shall remain ROBBIE'S 
separate property regardless of any change in form. By way of 
illustration only, if ROBBIE sells one of his separate properties 
and deposits the proceeds from the sale in a bank account, that 
bank account will remain ROBBIE'S separate property; if ROBBIE 
uses the payments he receives on a note secured by a deed of 
trust to invest in a business, that business, together with all 
of its assets, tangible and intangible, will remain ROBBIE'S 
separate property; if ROBBIE purchases an apartment building with 
his separate assets, the new apartment building will remain 
ROBBIE'S separate property. 
2. The parties agree that all rents, issues, profits, 
increase, appreciation and income from the separate property of 
HOPE, whether real or personal, shall remain her separate 
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property. The parties agree that a change in the form of HOPE'S 
separate property shall not constitute a change in 
characterization, and the separate property shall remain HOPE'S 
separate property regardless of any change in form. The 
illustration set forth in Paragraph 1.1. above is incorporated 
herein by reference. 
J. EFFECT OF TIME, SKILL AND EFFORT 
1. The parties agree that ROBBIE may devote 
considerable time, skill and effort to the investment and 
management of his separate property and the income from it. The 
parties agree that, notwithstanding that the expenditure of 
ROBBIE'S time, skill and effort might constitute a community 
interest or asset in the absence of this Agreement which would 
otherwise entitle HOPE to one-half (1/2) thereof, there shall not 
be any community interest from the expenditure of ROBBIE'S time, 
skill, and effort on his separate property, and any rents, 
issues, profits, increase, appreciation and income from the 
separate property of ROBBIE shall remain the separate property of 
ROBBIE. 
2. The parties agree that HOPE may devote 
considerable time, skill and effort to the investment and 
management of her separate property and the income from it. The 
parties agree that, notwithstanding that the expenditure of 
HOPE'S time, skill and effort might constitute a community 
interest or asset in the absence of this Agreement which would 
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otherwise entitle ROBBIE to one-half (1/2) thereof, there shall 
not be any community interest from the expenditure of HOPE'S 
time, skill and effort on her separate property, and any rents, 
issues, profits, increase, appreciation and income from the 
separate property of HOPE shall remain the separate property of 
HOPE. 
3. The expenditure of time, effort, skill and money 
by one party for the benefit of the separate property of the 
other party shall be deemed to be a gift to the other unless 
otherwise agreed to in writing. 
K. WAIVER OF INTEREST IN GOODWILL 
Each party acknowledges that the other, by virtue of 
his or her career development before marriage and during the term 
of the marriage, may have acquired or may acquire a factor of 
goodwill (or any analogous or comparable factor, however 
described) in his or her profession, practice or other business 
entity or entities, and may increase or decrease the value during 
the marriage. Each party hereby agrees that any such goodwill 
(or analogous) factor is and shall remain the separate property 
of the party in whose profession, practice or business entity the 
goodwill exists, and that any increase or decrease in such 
goodwill factor during the term of the marriage, shall not 
effect, and shall not be considered in determining, the parties1 
marital property rights pursuant to the laws of the State of 
California, or pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement. 
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L. EFFECT OF COMMINGLING 
The occurrence of commingling or otherwise failing to 
segregate the separate property or separate income of either 
party shall neither change nor constitute a change in the 
character of that property, nor shall it constitute a 
transmutation of that separate property or income into community, 
quasi-community, joint marital, or similar type of property. 
M. REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 
1. Any personal property acquired by the parties 
jointly hereafter (defined as an acquisition where title is taken 
in both parties1 names, or where the parties sign a writing as to 
the joint nature of such acquisition), shall be owned by them as 
tenants-in-common or joint tenants or community property, as the 
parties then so decide, each party holding an undivided one-half 
(1/2) interest. 
2. Any motor vehicles, trailers, boats or other items 
of personal property subject to registration and certificates of 
ownership by the State of California or other states, countries 
or jurisdictions, shall be the property of the person whose name 
is shown as the registered owner on the certificate of ownership, 
and if title is taken in both names, or where the parties sign a 
writing as to the joint nature of such acquisition, shall be 
owned by them as tenants-in-common or joint tenants or community 
property, as the parties then so decide, each party holding an 
undivided one-half (1/2) interest. 
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3. Any real property acquired by the parties jointly 
in California or any other state hereafter shall be owned by each 
as tenants-in-common or joint tenants or community property as 
the parties so decide, each party holding an interest according 
to title. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the 
parties jointly purchase a residence and/or income property, 
(defined as an acquisition where title is taken in both parties1 
names or where the parties make a writing as to the joint nature 
of such acquisition) , where title or a writing does not set forth 
a disproportionate interest, although the parties make no 
promises to do so, if either ROBBIE or HOPE contributes more than 
his or her equal share toward the down payment, reduction of 
principal on mortgage payments, or improvements, then the party 
contributing more than his or her equal share shall retain a 
right of reimbursement pursuant to Civil Code, §4800.2, from the 
net sale proceeds of the property. For purposes herein, "net 
sale proceeds" is defined as gross cash sale proceeds less all 
costs associated with the sale of the property, including 
brokers1 fees, the payment of all liens and encumbrances against 
said property, and the payment of all appropriate taxes. By way 
of illustration only, if ROBBIE contributes one hundred percent 
(100%) toward the down payment, reduction of principal or 
mortgage payments and/or improvements, then ROBBIE shall retain a 
right of reimbursement for one hundred percent (100%) of his 
contribution (representing the excess contribution) directly from 
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the net sale proceeds of the property; if ROBBIE contributes 
eighty percent (80%) and HOPE contributes twenty percent (20%) 
toward the down payment, reduction of principal on mortgage, 
and/or improvements, then ROBBIE shall retain a right of 
reimbursement for sixty percent (60%) of the contribution 
(representing the excess contribution) directly from the net sale 
proceeds of the property. In either of the foregoing examples, 
any equity or net sales proceeds remaining after reimbursement 
pursuant to Civil Code, §4.800.2 shall be equally divided between 
the parties. 
4. Except as specifically provided in this Agreement 
executed by the parties hereafter, all real and personal property 
acquired by either of the parties hereafter, except property 
acquired in the name of both parties or where the parties have 
made a writing as to the joint nature of such property or 
purchased from the funds in their joint checking and/or savings 
account(s) set forth in Paragraph R.5, below, shall be the 
separate property of the party acquiring the property. All real 
and personal property in which title is taken in the name of HOPE 
shall be the separate property of HOPE. All real and personal 
property in which title is taken in the name of ROBBIE shall be 
the separate property of ROBBIE. ROBBIE or HOPE may, from time 
to time, sell and/or purchase with his or her separate property 
additional real or personal property. Said additional 
investments shall remain the respective party's separate 
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property. ROBBIE and HOPE may, from time to time, sign loan 
documents to enable the other to acquire property. The fact that 
either party signs the loan application thereon, and loans are 
given based on same, will not alter title thereto and such 
property shall be and remain the separate property of the title 
holder. ROBBIE and HOPE shall indemnify and hold each other 
harmless from any liability assessed against either of them as a 
result of his or her signing any such loan applications for the 
other party's separate property acquisition. Unless otherwise 
agreed to in writing, or as provided in paragraph M.3. (regarding 
joint purchase of residence and/or income property), if either 
party makes payment on a mortgage or pays property taxes or makes 
improvements to or repairs, using either community or separate 
property, on any property for the other's benefit those funds 
shall be transmuted and deemed to be 3 gift to the other party 
and any right of reimbursement is waived so that the title to 
said property shall control in determining the interest of ROBBIE 
or HOPE in said property and the party making said payment shall 
not be entitled to any reimbursement. 
5. ROBBIE and HOPE agree that any contributions to 
any retirement plan, pension plan, profit sharing plan, KEOGH or 
IRA made on behalf of HOPE after the date of marriage which are 
attributable to services rendered by HOPE after the date of 
marriage shall remain the separate property of HOPE, and, except 
as otherwise provided herein, shall be subject to HOPE'S 
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disposition in the same manner as though the proposed marriage 
never had been entered into. 
ROBBIE acknowledges and agrees that he shall have 
no right, title or interest in and to any portion of HOPE'S 
pension plan. 
Pursuant to the terms of any such pension plan 
and/or as a matter of federal law, ROBBIE has been advised and 
understands that he may be entitled to survivor benefits under 
any such pension plan of HOPE and ROBBIE hereby waives all of his 
respective rights under any such pension plan and acknowledges 
that the effect of such waiver will be to deprive him of any and 
all such survivor benefits. ROBBIE agrees that, immediately 
after marriage, he will execute all forms required to effectuate 
the waiver of his rights to survivor benefits under any such 
pension plan of HOPE, including, without limitation, the Waiver 
Election of the Qualified Pre-retirement Survivor Annuity With 
Spousal Consent ("Waiver Form") which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein as Exhibit "E". If HOPE dies prior to the 
time when ROBBIE signs such forms, including the Waiver Form, 
ROBBIE agrees to hold any funds received by him from any such 
pension plan of HOPE as constructive trustee for the benefit of 
HOPEfs otherwise designated beneficiaries or, if none, her 
estate, and to immediately deliver any such funds to any such 
beneficiaries of HOPE or her estate. 
6. ROBBIE and HOPE agree that any contributions and 
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appreciation thereoh to any retirement plan, pension plan, profit 
sharing plan, KEOGH or IRA made on behalf of ROBBIE after the 
date of marriage which are attributable to services rendered by 
ROBBIE after the date of marriage shall remain the separate 
property of ROBBIE, and, except as otherwise provided herein, 
shall be subject to ROBBIE'S disposition in the same manner as 
though the proposed marriage never had been entered into. 
HOPE acknowledges and agrees that she shall have 
no right, title or interest in any portion of ROBBIE'S pension 
plan(s). 
Pursuant to the terms of any such pension plan 
and/or as a matter of federal law, HOPE has been advised and 
understands that she may be entitled to survivor benefits under 
any such pension plan of ROBBIE, and HOPE hereby waives all of 
her respective rights under any such pension plan and 
acknowledges that the effect of such waiver will be to deprive 
her of any and all such survivor benefits. HOPE agrees that, 
immediately after marriage, she will execute all forms required 
to effectuate the waiver of her rights to survivor benefits under 
any such pension plan of ROBBIE, including, without limitation, 
the Waiver Election of the Qualified Pre-retirement Survivor 
Annuity With Spousal Consent ("Waiver Form") which is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "E". If ROBBIE dies 
prior to the time when HOPE signs such forms, including the 
Waiver Form, HOPE agrees to hold any funds received by her from 
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any such pension plan of ROBBIE as constructive trustee for the 
benefit of ROBBIE'S otherwise designated beneficiaries or, if 
none, his estate, and to immediately deliver any such funds to 
any such beneficiaries of ROBBIE or his estate. 
N. GIFTS 
1. HOPE and ROBBIE agree that all property received 
by either party hereto by gift, bequest or devise shall remain 
the separate property of the receiving party; provided, however, 
that all wedding and anniversary gifts from third persons shall 
be considered community property and each party is entitled to a 
one-half (1/2) interest in said gifts. 
2. For an action, i.e., a payment, disbursement, 
transfer, etc., to constitute a gift between the parties, it must 
be accompanied by a writing which expressly declares that it is 
made as a gift. This provision does not apply to a gift between 
the parties of any one item of clothing, wearing apparel or 
jewelry with a market value of less than TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($10,000.00) or other tangible articles of a personal nature that 
is used solely or principally by the party to whom the gift is 
made. (The placing by one party of title in the name of the 
other party, as hereinbefore set forth, shall constitute a 
sufficient writing to establish a gift under this section.) 
O. TAXES 
1. ROBBIE and HOPE agree that ROBBIE shall have the 
option of whether or not to file joint federal or state income 
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tax returns with HOPE for any and all tax years, so long as the 
parties are married. The election, if any, by ROBBIE, after the 
parties' marriage, to file a federal or state income tax return 
or a joint return, rather than a separate return, shall not 
constitute a creation of any community property or of any other 
rights or interests in contravention of this Agreement. 
2. If ROBBIE and HOPE file joint returns, the parties 
agree that the tax liability of each party on any such returns, 
to be paid from his or her separate property, shall be allocated 
in the proportion that the tax liability of each party bears to 
the aggregate tax liability of both parties, such proportion to 
be determined based on a calculation of the single status tax 
liability of each. For example, if ROBBIE had filed a tax return 
as a single individual and his tax liability would have been 
TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($25,000.00), and HOPE's tax return 
filed as a single individual would have had a liability of FOUR 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00), HOPE shall pay four twenty-ninths 
(4/29ths) of the total tax liability on such returns, and ROBBIE 
shall pay twenty-five twenty-ninths (25/29ths) of the total tax 
liability on such returns. (In no event will HOPEfs obligation 
to contribute to the tax liability exceed her tax liability if 
she had filed separately from ROBBIE.) 
In the event ROBBIE elects for ROBBIE and HOPE to 
file separate returns, ROBBIE agrees that he will be responsible 
for any tax incurred by either party on their separate returns 
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and, in this regard, ROBBIE shall be entitled to use, for the 
payment of such tax liability, any withholding made on behalf of 
each of the parties. 
3. The parties agree that ROBBIE shall be solely 
responsible for the costs, if any, of preparing the joint 
returns. 
:
 4. ROBBIE hereby indemnifies and agrees to hold HOPE 
harmless from any and all claims, assessments, deficiencies, 
interest, penalties and fees and costs attributable to his income 
arising out of any federal or state income tax return heretofore 
or hereafter signed and filed by ROBBIE and HOPE jointly or 
ROBBIE solely. HOPE hereby indemnifies and agrees to hold ROBBIE 
harmless from any and all claims, assessment, deficiencies, 
interest, penalties and fees and costs attributable to her income 
arising out of any federal or state income tax return heretofore 
or hereafter signed and filed by ROBBIE and HOPE jointly or HOPE 
solely. 
5. ROBBIE agrees to report his income for the 
purposes of federal or state income tax returns, all income of 
whatsoever nature received by him or accruing to him from 
whatever source from the date of this Agreement and throughout 
the marriage of ROBBIE and HOPE, and to indemnify and hold HOPE 
harmless from any and all claims, assessments, deficiencies, 
penalties and fees and costs arising out of his non-inclusion of 
any such income or disallowance of any deduction, 
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6, HOPE agrees to report her income, as required by 
law for the purposes of federal or state income tax returns, all 
income of whatsoever nature received by her or accruing to her 
from whatever source, from the date of this Agreement and 
throughout the marriage of ROBBIE and HOPE, and to indemnify and 
hold ROBBIE harmless from any and all claims, assessments, 
deficiencies, penalties and fees and costs arising out of her 
non-inclusion of any such income or disallowance of any 
deduction. 
P. LIFE INSURANCE 
1. HOPE shall have the right, at her own expense, to 
obtain a policy of life insurance insuring the life of ROBBIE in 
any amount that HOPE, at her sole discretion, elects. HOPE shall 
own said policy as her sole and separate property. ROBBIE shall 
cooperate in submitting to any physical examination, no more than 
one (1) time per year, which is necessary to obtain and/or 
maintain said life insurance policy. HOPE waives the right to 
seek from ROBBIE any reimbursement for any payments made on the 
life insurance policy. 
2. ROBBIE shall have the right, at his own expense, 
to obtain a policy of life insurance insuring the life of HOPE in 
any amount that ROBBIE, at his sole discretion, elects. ROBBIE 
shall own said policy as his sole and separate property. HOPE 
shall cooperate in submitting to any physical examination, no 
more than one (1) time per year, which is necessary to obtain 
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and/or maintain said life insurance policy. ROBBIE waives the 
right to seek from HOPE any reimbursement for any payments made 
on the life insurance policy. 
3. In the unlikely event of a dissolution of marriage 
between the parties, the parties agree that each shall have the 
right to receive and have transferred to them the policy or 
policies insuring their life and, in the event a party chooses to 
exercise their right to cause the other party to transfer such a 
policy to them, the party then receiving the policy shall pay to 
the other party the cash surrender value, if any, of said policy 
forthwith. 
4. Notwithstanding the foregoing, ROBBIE shall 
acquire and maintain insurance on his life naming HOPE as the 
beneficiary, so long as the parties are married and living 
together, in an amount no less than $250,000.00 face value, free 
of any obligation. Within ninety (90) days of the execution of 
this Agreement, ROBBIE shall deliver to HOPE satisfactory proof 
that the policy or policies have been obtained, the amount of 
coverage and that the beneficiary designation is properly 
endorsed on the policy or policies. In the event ROBBIE elects 
to cancel and/or change said life insurance carrier and/or the 
beneficiary designation thereon, ROBBIE shall notify HOPE at 
least thirty (30) days prior to any such cancellation and/or 
change. Additionally, ROBBIE shall instruct the insurance 
carrier, in writing, that the carrier is to provide notice to 
AGRFI101.LEV 32 
HOPE of ROBBIE'S intent to cancel and/or change said life 
insurance carrier and/or beneficiary at least fifteen (15) days 
before any such cancellation and/or change is instituted. ROBBIE 
acknowledges and agrees that in the event the insurance policy or 
policies referenced hereinabove in this Paragraph P. 4. are not in 
effect at the time of ROBBIE'S death, his estate or successors 
are responsible for providing identical benefits to HOPE. 
5. In the unlikely event of a dissolution of marriage 
between the parties, ROBBIE'S obligation to maintain said life 
insurance referenced in Paragraph P.4. for HOPE'S benefit shall 
terminate and ROBBIE shall own said policy as his sole and 
separate property, and shall have the absolute right to designate 
any third person(s) as beneficiary, unless a court determines 
otherwise as security for spousal support. 
Q. FURNITURE AND FURNISHINGS 
1. All furniture and furnishings, antiques and works 
of art owned by ROBBIE prior to the date of marriage shall remain 
the separate property of ROBBIE. All furniture and furnishings, 
antiques and works of art owned by HOPE prior to the date of 
marriage shall remain the separate property of HOPE. All 
furniture and furnishings, antiques and works of art acquired 
during the time of marriage with ROBBIE'S separate property or as 
a gift shall be the separate property of ROBBIE. All furniture 
and furnishings, antiques and works of art acquired during the 
time of marriage with HOPE! s separate property or as a gift shall 
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be the separate property of HOPE. All furniture and furnishings, 
antiques and works of art acquired jointly during the time of 
marriage shall be owned by ROBBIE and HOPE as tenants-in-common 
or joint tenants or community property as the parties may decide, 
each party holding an undivided one-half (1/2) interest. (Said 
acquisition is defined as a purchase where title is taken in both 
parties' names or where the parties make a writing as to the 
nature of such acquisition.) 
2. In the event the funds of either party or the 
joint funds of the parties are used to recover, re-upholster, 
and/or repair the separate property furniture and furnishings, 
antiques or works of art of the other, such payment and/or 
disbursement shall be deemed to be a gift to said party with 
there being no right of reimbursement in regard to same nor any 
interest in said item of furniture and furnishings, antiques or 
works of art unless otherwise agreed in writing. 
3. In the unlikely event of a dissolution of marriage 
between the parties, HOPE will receive any furniture and 
furnishings, antiques, and works of art which are her separate 
property, and ROBBIE will receive any that are his separate 
property. As to any joint acquisitions of furniture and 
furnishings, antiques and works of art, if the parties are unable 
to agree on a division thereof, same shall be divided by 
alternative selection, based upon a jointly appraised value, with 
the party winning the flip of a coin making the first selection. 
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In the event any items remain which are not divided between the 
parties, same shall be contributed to a charity to be mutually 
chosen by the parties with the parties to each receive one-half 
(1/2) of the charitable deduction. 
R. SEPARATE AND COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS 
1. All obligations secured by, or incurred for the 
purchase of, real and/or personal property set forth in Exhibit 
»Alf shall remain the separate obligations of ROBBIE. ROBBIE 
warrants and represents that he does not have an interest in any 
real or personal property other than as set forth in Exhibit f,A". 
If it shall hereafter be determined that ROBBIE has an interest 
in any real and/or personal property other than as set forth in 
Exhibit "A", that was acquired prior to the execution of this 
Agreement, all obligations secured by or incurred for the 
purchase of such real and/or personal property shall remain the 
separate obligations of ROBBIE. HOPE shall not be liable for any 
of those obligations, and ROBBIE shall indemnify and hold HOPE 
harmless from any claims thereon by any creditors of ROBBIE, and 
from all fees and expenses that might be incurred in connection 
therewith. 
2. kll obligations secured >^7/ O T iTicxurxed iox \-Yie 
purchase of, real and/or personal property set forth in Exhibit 
»B" shall remain the separate obligations of HOPE. HOPE warrants 
and represents that she does not have an interest in any real or 
personal property other than as set forth in Exhibit ,fBlf. If it 
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shall hereafter be determined that HOPE has an interest in any 
real and/or personal property other than as set forth in Exhibit 
"B", that was acquired prior to the execution of this Agreement, 
all obligations secured by or incurred for the purchase of such 
real and/or personal property shall remain the separate 
obligations of HOPE. ROBBIE shall not be liable for any of those 
obligations, and HOPE shall indemnify and hold ROBBIE harmless 
from any claims thereon by any creditors of HOPE, and from all 
fees and expenses that might be incurred in connection therewith. 
3. All obligations set forth in Exhibit "C" of the 
Agreement, including, without limitations, any income tax 
obligations for any year prior to the year of marriage, shall 
remain the separate obligations of ROBBIE. ROBBIE warrants and 
represents that he does not have any obligations for which he is 
liable other than as set forth in Exhibit "C". If it shall 
hereafter be determined that ROBBIE has any obligations for which 
he is liable other than as set forth in Exhibit "C", all such 
obligations shall remain the separate obligations of ROBBIE. 
HOPE shall not be liable for those obligations, and ROBBIE shall 
indemnify HOPE from them and from all fees and expenses that 
might be incurred in connection therewith. 
4. All obligations set forth in Exhibit "D" of the 
Agreement, including, without limitation, any income tax 
obligations for any year prior to the year of marriage, shall 
remain the separate obligations of HOPE. HOPE warrants and 
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represents that she does not have any obligations for which she 
is liable other than as set forth in Exhibit "D". If it shall 
hereafter be determined that HOPE has any obligations for which 
she is liable other than as set forth in Exhibit "D", all such 
obligations shall remain the separate obligations of HOPE. 
ROBBIE shall not be liable for those obligations, and HOPE shall 
indemnify ROBBIE from them and from all fees and expenses that 
might be Incurred in connection therewith. 
5. Notwithstanding anything stated to the contrary 
above and below in this Agreement or any other written Agreement 
executed by the parties hereafter, so long as the parties are 
married and living together, the parties shall maintain a joint 
checking and/or savings account (held in joint tenancy with right 
of survivorship) into which both parties shall make contributions 
from his or her community earnings (as defined in Paragraph F. 
hereinabove) and from his or her separate property, as the 
parties may agree, to meet the living expenses of the parties. 
Such funds additionally may be used to make joint purchases or 
for such other purposes as the parties may from time to time 
agree. The parties may also maintain one or more joint credit 
cards, which credit card charges shall be used solely for joint 
living expenses, which shall be paid from the joint checking 
and/or savings account. 
6. As used herein the term "living expenses11 
includes, but is not limited to, the monthly payments on the 
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residence in which the parties are residing together (including 
principal, interest, taxes, upkeep and maintenance and 
association fees, if any), food, household supplies, housekeeper, 
utilities, including water, gas, electricity, cable, and 
telephone, laundry and cleaning, homeowner's insurance, personal 
upkeep, medical insurance, accident and auto insurance, gasoline, 
oil and auto repairs, joint vacation, joint entertainment 
expenses, and joint gifts, and other such expenses as the parties 
mutually agree upon in writing. 
7. Any and all monies, whether from each parties1 
separate funds, or from the parties1 joint funds, or community 
earnings (defined in Paragraph F. hereinabove), including, but 
without limitation to, monies from the parties1 joint checking 
account and/or savings account as set forth in Paragraph R.5. 
hereinabove, used to maintain, improve or otherwise enhance 
either parties1 separate property shall create no joint interest 
in said separate property unless the parties specifically 
otherwise agree in writing. The parties hereby waive any and all 
right to reimbursement of any kind of their separate or joint 
funds from any source, and any expenses of maintenance, 
improvement or enhancement of the other partyfs separate property 
paid from any source including, but not limited to funds from the 
parties1 joint checking and/or savings account as set forth in 
Paragraph R.5. Any and all such monies used to maintain, 
improve or enhance either party's separate property is deemed to 
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be a gift to that party. Additionally, any and all monies, 
whether from each party's separate funds or from the parties' 
joint funds (or from community property as defined in Paragraph 
F. hereinabove), used to maintain, improve, or otherwise enhance 
the parties1 community property is deemed to be a gift to the 
community property and the party contributing same hereby waives 
any and all right to reimbursement of any kind of their separate 
or joint funds and such maintenance, except as set forth in 
Paragraph M.3. hereinabove regarding joint purchase of a 
residence or income property. 
S. EXECUTION OF OTHER INSTRUMENTS 
1. Each party agrees that he or she shall, at the 
request of the other, take all steps, and execute, acknowledge 
and deliver to the other party all further instruments, necessary 
or expedient to effectuate the purposes and intent of this 
Agreement and shall do so in timely fashion when requested. 
2. Notwithstanding the failure of either party to 
execute any such instrument, this Agreement shall be in all 
respects operative as though said instruments were signed. 
3. HOPE further agrees to execute, acknowledge and 
deliver to ROBBIE quitclaim deeds on all real property purchased 
by ROBBIE from his separate property. ROBBIE agrees to execute, 
acknowledge and deliver to HOPE quitclaim deeds on all real 
property purchased by HOPE from her separate property. 
/// 
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T. PARTIES BOUND 
This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto 
and their respective heirs, executors, assigns, trustees, 
administrators, successors and personal representatives. 
U. SPOUSAL SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
This Agreement covers only property rights and 
intentionally does not address spousal support issues. The 
issues of spousal support are not waived by either party and 
shall be reserved to the jurisdiction of the court or written 
agreement of the parties. 
ROBBIE acknowledges that, in the event the parties 
eliminate spending any extended time in Southern California and 
reside in a rural area, if HOPE is still pursuing her acting 
and/or modeling career, she will potentially be unable to 
continue pursuing same under the new circumstances and, in the 
unlikely event the parties terminate their relationship, the 
court may take this into consideration regarding any support 
issue, notwithstanding the fact that this conceivable could be a 
marriage of short duration. 
V. GENERAL RELEASE 
By this Agreement, ROBBIE and HOPE intend to define all 
rights and obligations between them. Except as otherwise 
expressly provided in this Agreement, each of them releases the 
other from all debts, liabilities and obligations of every kind, 
previously incurred, including both personal obligations and 
AGRFI101.LEV 40 
encumbrances on the other party's separate property. 
Except for the claims, demands and rights in this 
Agreement created or reserved against either of the parties 
hereto, which claim, demands and rights are expressly reserved 
from the operation of this paragraph, each of the parties hereto, 
for himself and herself and their respective heirs, executors, 
administrators and assigns, hereby releases and discharges the 
other party and his or her respective heirs, executors, 
administrators and assigns, of and from any and all past claims 
and demands of every kind, nature and description. 
Each of the parties hereto does hereby waive with 
respect to the other the provisions of Section 1542 of the Civil 
Code of the State of California relating to claims affected by a 
general release, which provides as follows: 
,fA general release does not extend to claims 
which the creditor does not know or suspect 
to exist in his favor at the time of 
executing the release, which if known by him 
must have materially affected his settlement 
with the debtor.", 
and, except as aforesaid, this Agreement is intended to and does 
release all claims, which either of the parties may have against 
the other. 
W. ENTIRE AGREEMENT; MODIFICATION 
1. This Agreement contains the entire understanding 
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and agreement of the parties, and there have been no promises, 
representations, agreements, warranties, or undertakings by 
either party or to the other, either oral or written, of any 
character or nature, except as set forth herein. This Agreement 
may be altered, amended, or modified only by an instrument in 
writing, executed and acknowledged by the parties to this 
Agreement, and by no other means. 
2. The parties agree that they occasionally may use 
such expressions as "our property", "our house" or "our bank 
account" when referring to property that is, by the terms of this 
Agreement, separate property. The parties further agree that 
they sometimes may commingle separate property and/or property 
that would otherwise be community property but for this 
Agreement, or may make statements or take actions that are or 
appear to be inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement. 
Notwithstanding any of the above, the parties agree that this 
Agreement may be altered, amended, or modified only as set forth 
in Paragraph W.I., above. 
X. APPLICABLE LAW 
This Agreement is executed in the State of California 
and shall be subject to and interpreted under the laws of the 
State of California. Although this Agreement is executed in the 
State of California and it makes reference to separate, community 
and quasi-community property, the parties agree that it is their 
intent that this Agreement shall cover all rights of property, 
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whether the property is situated within or without the State of 
California, or within or without the United States of America. 
Y. SEVERABILITY 
Every provision of this Agreement is intended to be 
severable. In the event any terms, provision, covenant, or 
condition of this Agreement is declared to be illegal or invalid 
for any reason whatsoever by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
such illegality or invalidity shall not affect the other terms 
and provisions hereof, which shall remain binding and 
enforceable. 
Z. ATTORNEYS' FEES 
In the event of a dispute between the parties arising 
out of the terms, conditions and obligations imposed by this 
Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorneys1 fees, costs and expenses incurred in 
connection therewith. This provision shall not constitute a 
waiver by either party of attorneys' fees and costs which may be 
awarded by the Court relative to issues of spousal support, child 
support, modifications and/or enforcement thereof pursuant to the 
Family Law Act (California Civil Code, §4000 et seq.). 
AA. WAIVER 
No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement 
shall be deemed, or shall constitute, a waiver of any other 
provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver 
constitute a continuing waiver. No waiver shall be binding 
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unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver. 
AB. ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE 
The parties and their counsel agree that the execution 
of the Attorney's Certificate by the attorney on behalf of either 
of the parties shall not constitute a waiver of the 
attorney/client privilege between the attorney and the party they 
represent. 
A C CAPTIONS 
The captions of the various paragraphs in this 
Agreement are for the convenience of the parties only, and none 
of them are intended to be any part of the text of this 
Agreement, nor intended to be referred to in construing any of 
the provisions hereof. 
AD. EXECUTION IN COUNTERPARTS 
This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of 
which shall be deemed to be an original and all such counterparts 
shall together constitute one and the same instrument. 
AE. DRAFTING OF AGREEMENT 
HOPE and ROBBIE both acknowledge and agree that both 
parties actively participated in the negotiation and drafting of 
this Agreement, and should any ambiguities exist in this 
Agreement, same shall not be construed against the one drafting 
this Agreement. 
AF. EFFECTIVE DATE 
This Agreement shall be effective as of the date 
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hereinbefore set forth. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Agreement on the date hereinafter sej^fbrth. 
Dated ?V^?/ 
Dated ,AyKfrl~^, r9?f 
OPE'MARIE RIZZITAN "ZZTTANO/ CJ^\ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
/ 1 
SIMKE, CHODOS, SILBERFBLp & 
ANTEAU, INC. 
Ronald W. Anteau, 
Attorneys for ROBERT LEVIN 
FLYNN, KN 
By. 
LER 
)nnolly Oyler, 
Attorneys for HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO 
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ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he is an Attorney at 
Law duly licensed and admitted to the practice of law in the 
State of California; that he has been employed by HOPE MARIE 
RIZZITANO, one of the parties to the foregoing Agreement; that he 
has advised and consulted with HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO with respect 
to her and ROBERT LEVINfs rights and has fully explained to her 
the legal significance under California law the foregoing 
agreement, and the effect which it has upon her rights; that HOPE 
MARIE RIZZITANO, after having been so advised by the undersigned, 
acknowledged to the undersigned that she understood fully the 
terms of the foregoing Agreement and the legal effect thereof 
within the State of California, and that she executed the same 
freely and voluntarily; and that the undersigned has no reason to 
believe that HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO did not understand fully such 
terms and effects, or that she did not freely and voluntarily 
execute said Agreement, such execution being in the undersigned's 
presence. 
Dated , 
/ V 
\7^/^> l*^ . 1991 FLYNN, KNERR & OYLER 
Connrilly/Oyler 
Attorneys for 
HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO 
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ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he is an Attorney at 
Law duly licensed and admitted to the practice of law in the 
State of California; that he has been employed by ROBERT LEVIN, 
one of the parties to the foregoing Agreement; that he has 
advised and consulted with ROBERT LEVIN with respect to his and 
HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO's rights and has fully explained to him the 
legal significance under California law the foregoing Agreement, 
and the effect which it has upon his rights; that ROBERT LEVIN, 
after having been so advised by the undersigned, acknowledged to 
the undersigned that he understood fully the terms of the 
foregoing Agreement and the legal effect thereof within the State 
of California, and that he executed the same freely and 
voluntarily; and that the undersigned has no reason to believe 
that ROBERT LEVIN did not understand fully such terms and 
effects, or that he did not freely and voluntarily execute said 
Agreement, such execution being in the undersigned's presence. 
DATED 1991 SIMKE ,/CHODOS , SILBERFE 
ANTEAU, INC. 
Ronald W. Anteau 
Attorneys for ROBERT LEVIN 
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
SS. 
On this ifE^day of N^^^z^L±^
 Tf 1991, before me the 
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County and State, 
residing herein duly commissioned and sworn, personally appeared 
HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO, known to me (or proven to me on the basis 
of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledge to me that 
she executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
-c^-sr^Hf 
OFFICIAL NOTARY SEAL 
SANDRA L BANKS 
notary Public—California 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
My Comm. Expire JUN 23,1^5 
• Ill M II I " " ' 
n , » ^ ip n» m m ' » n> *j 19 v •»"*>" 
*-^ 2< 
~?\ 
<&-*-*^r> 
/ Notary Public in and for the 
County of Los Angeles, State 
of California 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) 
SS-
On this /grrH day of <O0r£(AB&P-~ , 1991, before me the 
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said County and State, 
residing herein duly commissioned and sworn, personally appeared 
ROBERT LEVIN, known to me (or proven to me on the basis of 
satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name is subscribed 
to the within instrument, and acknowledge to me that he executed 
the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
'asUjUuu+^&Jj OtfA^TKA. 
Notary Public in and for the 
County of Los Angeles, State 
of California 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF ROBERT LEVIN 
Stocks and Bonds $ 6,000,000 
Pension, 401K, IRA, 280,000 
Profit Sharing, etc. 
Real Estate 1,300,000 
Loans Receivable 2,100,000 
and Trust Deeds 
Furniture, Furnishings, Electronics, 180,000 
and Artwork (at cost) 
Motor Vehicles 71,000 
Musical Instruments 28,000 
Gun Collection 20,000 
Jewelry 22,000 
Coin Collection 
2,500 Gold Coins Value Not 
800 Silver Coins Determined 
TOTAL In Excess of 
$10,000,000 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ROBERT LEVIN 
None. 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF HOPE MARIE RIZZITANO 
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WAIVER ELECTION OF THE QUALIFIED PRERETIREMENT SURVIVOR 
ANNUITY WITH SPOUSAL CONSENT " 
(H Company*) 
(Name of Company) — 
("Plan") 
(Name of Plan) 
THIS WAIVER ELECTION AND SPOUSAL CONSENT FORM AFFECTS 
VALUABLE RIGHTS TO DEATH BENEFITS UNDER THE PLAN, AND THE COMPANY 
ENCOURAGES YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF YOUR LAWYER, 
ESTATE PLANNER OR OTHER TAX ADVISOR BEFORE SIGNING. 
WAIVER ELECTION 
I am i Participant in the Plan. I have read the EXPLANATION 
OF THE aUATJPIED PRERETIREMENT SURVIVOR ANNUITY. I understand 
that; (1) if I die before I retire and I have been married for at 
least one year, any death benefit under the Plan will be paid to 
my spouse in a monthly pension annuity for the life of my spouse 
(a "spousal annuity") unless my spouse and I sign this Waiver 
Election and Consent; (2) I have the right to waive (give up) the 
spousal annuity, but only if my spouse consents to the waiver; 
and (3) if my spouse consents to the waiver, I have the right to 
(i) choose a beneficiary other than my spouse to receive any 
death benefit from the Plan; (ii) specify a form of pension 
benefit payment other than a survivor annuity; and (iii) cancel 
any waiver at any time during my life without my spouse's 
consent. 
Please check one box below. If you do not check a 
box, this Waiver Election is void and any death -
benefits will be paid to your spouse in the form 
of a Qualified Preretirement Survivor Annuity. 
[Check Box A if you want your spouse to receive any death benefit 
but you want the benefits to be paid in a form other than a 
spousal annuity. Your spouse must check Box 1 of the Spousal 
Consent.J 
f 1 A. I waive (give up) the payment of a survivor annuity to 
my spouse and request that any death benefits payable on my death 
be paid to my spouse in the form stated in the most recent 
Beneficiary Designation on file with the Plan. 
EXHIBIT "E -1-
heneficiary o ther than your [Check Box B i f you want to n ^
 c h i n g e the benef ic ia ry in 
spouse now but you w i l l not be , consent — t h i s i s 
the future without get t ing y o ^ «Po u° ^
 m i i g f ^ h G c k B o x 2_ 
called a Speci f ic Waiver Elect ion. I£_
 R n y ^ Q £ t £ ^ j T I l I t I o n 
of the Spousal C o n s g n t a n j ^ ^ i a ^ — ^ ^ 
Tor P a r t i c i p a t l o n ^ H l J ^ n e i ^ i a r y _ D e g ^ 
s *.ua navment of a Qualified 
- ] B. I waive {give up) ^ ^ " J ^ ^ u s a if I ^ before I 
Preretirement-siXrvivor A n f ^ y _ f b S n e f i t s to the persons named in 
r e t i r e and reques t P ^ " ™ Designation on f i l e with the Plan. 
the most recen t Beneficiary ue* y 
««* a benefic iary o ther than your [Check Box C i f you want to name a ben
 t h e
y
b e n e f i c i a r y a t any 
spouse and a l so want to ^ able to cna g
 l n fche f u 
time without g e t t i n g your » P ° £ e E J e £ J o n . y | u r _ s p _ o u s ^ j m i s ^ ^ c k 
t h i s i s c a l l e d a General Waiver * 
Box 3 of tb* gpr,»flal Consent.] 
. i-v,-. rvwment of a Qualified Pre-
~ ] C. I waive (give up) the P « Y ^ J e i f j U d i e b e f o r e I r e t i r e 
re t i rement S^vT^or Annuity to my v^ ^ ^
 i f t t h e m o f i t r e c e n t 
and request payment of my beneri
 p l a n > 
Beneficiary Designation on f i l e wi^ 
Executed t h i s o f 
Signature of Pa r t i c ipan t 
Name ot Par t i c ipan t (Please *nm:7 
- 2 -
SPOUSAL CONSENT 
* ^ u1 Jeclare under penalty of perjury that (1) i
 am the spouse 
c the Participant making the Waiver Election above; (2) I am not 
acting under duress or undue influence; and (3) I have read and 
understand my right to survivor benefits under the Plan as stated 
in the attached "Explanation of the Qualified Preretirement 
Survivor Annuity." 
Please check the appropriate box below, if yOU do 
not check a box or if you check the wrong box, this 
Spousal Consent is void and any death benefits will 
be paid to you in the form of a Qualitied Prera'Efr'e-
menr survivor Annuity. " 
(Check Box 1 if your spouse checked Box A of the Waiver 
Election.] 
i—rJ a: . Spousal Consent to Form of Benefit. I understand that 
reaerai law gives me the automatic right to receive survivor 
benefits from the Plan if any death benefits are due upon my 
spouse's death. I
 a l a o understand that if I consent to this 
Ufiri?* £ion' I am ?ivin9 UP ™Y r i 9 h t to receive the survivor 
benefits under the Plan in a monthly survivor annuity which 
federal law would give to me automatically, andl consent to 
tnis. I also understand that (1) the effect of this Waiver" 
H £ P I * U t9 u° Cd?fe my r i g h t to m y spouse's death benefits under 
,
 e
 ^
xan
.
 t o b<s
 Paid to me in a way which may not provide me with 
inC5??,i0J<the ^ S t o f ray l i f e ; l2) my s p o u 3 e n*y change the way 
i " ^ , ? h i a o r > r death benefits may be paid to me at any time 
without consulting me; and (3) I cannot cancel my consent. 
[Check 3ox 2 if your spouse checked Box B of the Waiver 
Election.] 
Jr-,3,,2.', Spousal Consent to Specific Waiver ElecMnn i under-
stand that federal law gives me the automatic right to receive 
survivor benefits from the Plan if any death benefits are due 
J ElX? US? V e a t h ' J alS° u n d e r s t a n d tha* if I consent to-
mioit V Electl°n> I am giving up my right to receive survivor 
benefits from the Plan which federal law would give to me auto-
matically and I consent to this. I also understand that (1) my 
spouse has named another benericiary to receive any death 
hfnf^f ff?muthe P l a n flnd t h i £ C a u s e s m e t o l o e e valuable death benefits which would have been paid to me and I also consent to 
±515'' <2> my spouse may not change the desicmated beneficiary— 
be Said JX ttnETt}- (3) ^ sP°" B e. m ay ^use the death benefits to 
cholsea In* ?° d e e a ? n a t e d bfnef*Clary fn *"* f o ™ that he or she 
^hTfornT^ k f° co?8gnt to this, (4) my
 3 p o u s e m a y n o t ch 
my cogent U n e t i t w i t h o u t mY consent; and (5) I cannot cancel 
•1-
[Check Box 3 i f your spouse checked Box C of the Waiver 
E l e c t i o n . ] 
I under-r—1 3 Snousal Consent «^_g»neral Waiver Election. I under-
i t ^ d ^ a ^ S S ^ y g i v e T S r t h e automatic fight ^ o receive 
survivor benefits fro, the Plan if any ^Tt^?consent^ 
3SS Waiv^llectJon? I al g ving% my right to receive survivor 
£ ? f S ! ^ IZo^trlll^l^ aTore 
above* I also understand tnar K±> ^  * x r
 n a l l.^i. r?^*h 
clary other than me, this will cause me to lose J * ^ ^ * - * , 
benefits which would have been paid ^ine and I also consent to 
this- (2) even if mv spouse names roe as the beneficiary or ma or 
iitTs.Uis.'cs ^ r~ppe? S H 3 r L 
-7 *_ w • J a. ~~ <*•, * WAV which may not provide me witn Plan to ba paid to me in a way wmui i j „*,*-+. *.* fVn>. t^ nd 
*r f.i_ -x. ,*.£
 M„ 1,'fA and I also consent to tms, «ana income for the rest of my nie, auu _ 
(4) I cannot cancel my consent. 
Signed this day of _ • 1 9_-
Signature of Participant's Spou se 
Witnessed by; 
Plan Representative 
OR 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF ) 
before me, the undersigned, 
a Notary PuSlic in and ror-JaTd^titi, personally appeared 
— n 1 +.~
 wa ^v- Proved to me on the basis of satis-
personally known to me °£provea
 w h o s e name is subscribed to the 
factory evidence to be the P««° ^
 [he/she3 executed the 
within instrument and acxnowieuyeu j, 
same. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
Notary Public in and far 
9aid County and State 
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EXPLANATION OF QUALIFIED PRERETIREMENT SURVIVOR ANNUITY 
, .("Company") 
J " P l a n " ) 
(Name of P l a n ) 
Please read this explanation carefully! If
 you are marriedi 
YOUR SPOUSE WILL AUTOMATICALLY RECEIVE ANY DEATH 
BENEFIT FROM THE PLAN IN THE FORM OF A OUALTFTPD 
PRERLTl^MENT .^RVIVQR ANNUITY IF YOU "HAVE BEET?" 
S»?£}E!?„!'^ A T LEAST ONE YEAR ON YOUR DATE O F — 
yjfil iY. ~^s Y0U CHOOSE ANOTHER FORM OF PAYMENT OF 
TOIT^M^ITS OR ANOTHER BENEFICIAL fly sifiWTM^ ° 
WAIVER ELECTION AND YOUR SPOUSE SIGNS A CONSENT 
WHAT 15 THE QUALIFIED PRERETIREMENT SURVIVOR ANNUITY? 
A Qualified Preretirement Survivor Annuity gives your sDouse a 
inonthly pension^ payment for the rest of his or her iff fT t you 
die before retirement. The exact amount of the monthly pension 
payment your spouse* will receive will depend on (1) the kind of 
plan the Company has, (2) the earliest age at which you can 
receive payment of benefits from the Plan; (3) the torn of 
K n « 7 ™ °*nefit P W w i t required by the Plan; and (4) your earned 
pension or account balance at the time of your death' 
purchL^o? J? * defined contribution plan (profit sharing, money 
purchase or target benefit pension, or stock bonus) the nonthlv 
pension payment will be the amount that can be nxirahsipri i^+-h 
your entire account balance at the time of your death? 
rfceive^mnnJh? defined b5 n e fi£ P e n sf o n P1*** 7°ur spouse will 
ta H £ J!«J£? y P e n s i o n for *he rest of hi* or her life equal 
to the monthly retirement pension you would have received if von 
retired from the Company the day before your death? Y 
Sn«^SaT.t?P\?f*plan' if the 0 u a l i f i e d Preretirement Survivor 
Annuity is worth $3,500.00 or lesa, then the Plan may simply oav 
s^ilfbfpaiSlo' !? ° n e i U m? SUm* BUt ^ d e a t h beaL!itPvill 
-1-
WHAT IS THE V7AIVER ELECTION? 
** ,or when you leave the Company if you are 
When you become age 35 (or wner * ^
 } a g i v e u ? (waive) 
under age 35 and have a vested bener1*1 , y y y 
the Qualified Preretirement Survivor A n n u . t y ^ x g ^ 
called a Waiver Election, m i s m w j 
(waive) the right: 
(1) to have your death benefit paid to your spouse as a 
survivor annuity, or 
(2) to have your spouse automatically named as your 
beneficiary, or 
(3) to both (1) and (2). 
,
 4 „ i ai+-v,pr or both of these r i g h t s , you may If you give up <«*ive> " " * * ° L Z ° before your death. This w i l l cancel the Waiver Election any t ^ e b e f o ^ y ^ ^ ^ ^ 
reinstate the Q u a l ^ f / * * * w ^ r Election. Your spouse must 
spouse unless you «ign ? n;w ff^
 p u b l i c o r p l a n representative 
consent in w r i t i n g . ^ j g r g ^ ^ f i E V - g g — - ^ e g n Q t n a v £ t o c o n 8 e nL 
to your Waiver Election nur. v"ut VM_ i . ,,, — 
If you want to cancel y o x ~ w ^ v e r a u c t i o n . 
i , i \ +*»• oualified Preretirement Survivor 
If you give up twelve) the Qu«J«^
 n a m e & b e n e f i . Annuity and your spouse c o n f e ^ S l J e i v e any death benef i t s from ciary other than your spouse to ^ c e i v e any ae ^ ^ ^ 
the Plan; and (2) specify a * « £ <*,B^Ur surviving spouse or to 
survivor annuity/ whether payaoie * 
another beneficiary. 
If you are not married when y o u ^ ^ ^ ^ f ^ " 
payable under the Plan w i l l be pax^ y ^ ^
 d p r i o r 
But this may not be txae^tjwx^
 i i m n e d iate lv not i fy the 
to your death. Therefore, Vou s n o , ^ _, ,,U11 *— Company of any eTSngel" yn t t r rftAJ-Llal s t a t U 8 ' 
WHAT IS THE F ^ T OF A WAIVER ELECTION? 
, • i 4-fca nul l i f ied Prftrfttirement Survivor 
If you give UP (waive the P H ^ I f — ^
 r E C e i v e a n y deltE— Annuity and name a n o t n ? r r j g g | j _ ^ y understand that your 
^ S ^ t r n o t ^ a S ^ ^ ^ l a J a L ^ * " ^ ^ 
death. 
, - . • ~„ *-rt vnur spouse the automatic r ight to 
The federal law gives to your spo ^ ^
 u p Q n y o u r d e a f c h > 
receive payment of a death f
 Q ^ ^ t a n d your rights 
a J ^ o b i i g t S o n s cohncer^ng1our dea?h benefit. 
^ - - o m a M c r i s h ^ ^ 
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